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Introduction
There are two things that everyone knows about the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals: it is very large, and it is very liberal. But common
knowledge is sometimes wrong. 1 Is that the case here?
About the first point there can be no dispute. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has 29 authorized judgeships, almost twice as many
as the second-largest court. 2 Its caseload exceeds that of the First,
Second, and Third Circuits combined. 3 In 2020, its judges decided more
than one-fifth of the appeals considered by all twelve regional circuits. 4
A research paper recently released by the Federal Reserve begins:
“Mainstream economics is replete with ideas that ‘everyone knows’ to be true, but
that are actually arrant nonsense.” See Greg Ib, Is Fed’s Inflation View Built on
Sand? A Staffer Suggests So, Stirring Debate About Economics, Wall St. J., Oct. 14,
2021 at A2 (quoting Federal Reserve research paper).
1

See 28 U.S.C. § 44. The next-largest court is the Fifth Circuit, with 17
authorized judgeships.
2
3

See Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2020, Tbl. B.

4

Id. Tbl. B-10.
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The Ninth Circuit – the geographic unit of judicial governance and
administration – also stands out for its size. 5 It includes California and
eight other states, and it embraces 20% of the country’s population. No
other circuit comes close to those numbers. 6
But what about the second point – the liberalism? Certainly there
is much to support the characterization. Forty years ago, President
Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, appointed 15 of the 23 judges on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 7 Those judges were predominantly liberal,
and some were extremely liberal. The effect was to create a court that
was widely regarded as a liberal court, especially in comparison to the
Supreme Court. For example, in 1984, the Wall Street Journal
published a story aptly summarized by its headline: “Judicial
Mavericks: Ninth Circuit’s Judges Frequently Run Afoul of the
Supreme Court – Most of Them are Liberals Named by Jimmy Carter
and Are Often Reversed – Ideological Clash ‘Inevitable.’” 8 In the same
year, the Los Angeles Times noted that after the Carter appointments,
the Ninth Circuit “was suddenly perceived by many court observers as
liberal.” 9 A year later, Newsweek magazine reported on efforts by the
The role of the circuit as an organ of governance is oven overlooked. For
discussion of that role, see Doris Marie Provine, Governing the Ungovernable: The
Theory and Practice of Governance in the Ninth Circuit, in Restructuring Justice
247-80 (Arthur D. Hellman ed. 1990). In this Article, I shall use “Ninth Circuit” as a
shorthand to refer to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
5

For detailed statistics, see The Case for Restructuring the Ninth Circuit: An
Inevitable Response to an Unavoidable Problem: Hearing on Oversight of the
Structure of the Federal Courts Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action,
Federal Rights and Federal Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
(2018) (written testimony of Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
6

Ten of the 15 appointments were to new positions created by the Omnibus
Judgeship Act of 1978, Public Law 95-486; the others filled vacancies. See infra Part
II. The 1978 Act created a total of 35 appellate judgeships, all of which were filled by
President Carter during his remaining two years in office.
7

James B. Stewart, Judicial Mavericks: Ninth Circuit’s Judges Frequently Run
Afoul of the Supreme Court – Most of Them are Liberals Named by Jimmy Carter
and Are Often Reversed – Ideological Clash ‘Inevitable, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1984
(available on NEXIS).
8

William Overend, 9th Circuit – “Court of Last Resort,” Los Angeles Times, Dec.
23, 1984.
9
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Reagan administration “to help change the liberal cast of the Ninth
Circuit appeals court.” 10
The perception was not confined to the media. The Wall Street
Journal story quoted University of California Law Professor William A.
Fletcher, the son of a Ninth Circuit judge who would later be appointed
to the court himself: “The Ninth Circuit is probably the most liberal
court of appeals in the country.” 11 Ninth Circuit Chief Judge James R.
Browning, appointed to the court by President Kennedy in 1961,
commented: “As a result of the addition of the new judges during
President Carter’s administration, a rather conservative court of
appeals was converted into a rather liberal one.” 12
Although all of the Carter judges have died or taken senior status,
the pattern of dominance by appointees of Democratic Presidents has
continued in the Ninth Circuit for all but nine of the ensuing years.
And research has shown that across a wide variety of issues, judges
appointed by Democratic Presidents reach systematically more liberal
results than those produced by Republican appointees. 13 Thus it is not
surprising that the perception of the Ninth Circuit as a liberal court
has continued to this day. For example, a New York Times story
published in March 2020 described the Ninth Circuit as “a reliably
liberal appeals court” that “has long issued rulings favorable to liberal
causes.” 14
Not everyone agrees with the characterization, however. Almost
twenty years ago, Professor (now Dean) Erwin Chemerinsky, a
prominent liberal academic, published an article with the title “The
Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit.” 15 Professor Chemerinsky
Aric Press, Judging the Judges, Newsweek, Oct. 14, 1985, at 73 (available on
NEXIS).
10
11

See Stewart, supra note 8.

Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 106
F.R.D. 103, 161 (1984) (remarks of Judge James R. Browning).
12
13

See infra note 26 and accompanying text.

Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal
Courts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2020, at xx.
14

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 Loyola of L.A.
L. Rev. 1 (2003).
15
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acknowledged that “the media constantly generalizes and portrays the
Ninth Circuit as a liberal court out of the mainstream.” But, he said,
“[b]y any measure, this is simply wrong.” 16 More recently, an
experienced Ninth Circuit practitioner said that “impressions” of a
“heavily left-wing ideological court” were “probably off” in the past and
are “certainly not [accurate] now.” 17 Another lawyer, echoing Professor
Chemerinsky’s comment, saw the “story” of the liberal Ninth Circuit as
“a little bit more myth than reality.” 18
So the lines of debate are clearly drawn. But until now, no one has
empirically tested whether the Ninth Circuit is indeed the liberal
bastion that it is reputed to be. That is the task undertaken by this
Article. The Article draws on a unique database that includes case
information not readily available in any public source.
The focus of the study is the court’s en banc process. But analyzing
the ideological orientation of the Ninth Circuit using that approach
presents a special challenge. For all of the other circuits, it makes sense
to look at the outcomes of the cases that are heard en banc, because all
of the active judges take part in en banc decisions. But in the Ninth
Circuit, en banc cases are heard and decided by a limited en banc court
(LEBC) composed of the chief judge and ten judges selected at random
from among the other 28 active judges. 19 The only judicial activity that
involves the participation of all of the court’s active judges is the vote
on whether to grant en banc rehearing – typically, of a case already
decided by a three-judge panel. 20 If the common perception is correct,
the study should show that the court has used the en banc process to
produce predominately liberal case outcomes.
The accuracy of the perception is of considerably more than
academic interest. Judges appointed by President Donald J. Trump
may have moved the court in a more centrist direction, but the election
16

Id. at 20.

Jack Karp, Reversals of 9th Cir. at High Court Last Term Show a Pattern,
Law360, July 28, 2021 (quoting attorney Ben Feuer).
17
18

Id. (quoting attorney Mark Kressel).

19

See infra Part II.A.

In a small number of cases, the judges vote on en banc rehearing before a
panel has issued its decision. See id.
20
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of Joe Biden as President in 2020 assures that dominance by
Democratic appointees will continue at least for the immediate future.
And irrespective of what the future holds, the ideological orientation of
the Ninth Circuit is a matter with immense practical consequences.
Although much attention has focused on the Ninth Circuit’s supposedly
high reversal rate in the United States Supreme Court, 21 the reality is
that the Supreme Court reviews only a tiny fraction of the Ninth
Circuit’s decisions. Indeed, the total number of cases from all circuits
heard by the Supreme Court rarely rises much above 60 per Term. 22
Thus, on a vast array of federal issues, the law that controls is the law
of the circuit. If liberal jurisprudence has held sway in the Ninth
Circuit, this hegemony has significant consequences for governmental
powers, for individual liberties, and for entrepreneurial freedom in onefifth of the nation. Moreover, the effects sometimes extend beyond
circuit boundaries; when venue rules are flexible, Ninth Circuit law can
become the national law. 23
This study of en banc balloting will also illuminate two other
aspects of adjudication in the federal courts of appeals. First, it will
enable us to gain unique insights into the content of judicial ideology
today. Judges have complete discretion in deciding whether to call for a
vote on rehearing en banc. They are not limited to the cases to which
they have been assigned on three-judge panels; they can choose any
case, constrained only by the broad criteria of FRAP 35(a). 24 Moreover,
if the call fails, the judges have the option of publishing a dissent from
denial. By studying en banc activity, we can identify the issues that
See, e.g., Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s
Record in the Supreme Court Through October Term 2010, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev.
2165 (2012);
21

See, e.g., The Supreme Court – The Statistics, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 491, 500
(2021) (in 2020 Term, 57 cases from all courts of appeals decided with full opinions).
22

See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari at 23, Intel Corp. Investment Policy
Committee v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768 (2020) (“plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to file
nationwide class actions will no doubt see the advantage in the Ninth Circuit’s
timeliness rule.”); Petition for Certiorari at 31, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514
(2019) (“after this decision it seems unlikely that an antitrust class action against
the major ecommerce companies would be filed anywhere other than the Ninth
Circuit.”)
23

24

See infra Part II.A.
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the judges see as important and the kinds of decisions that they see as
so wrong as to require correction by an en banc court.
The study will illuminate both sides of the ideological divide. Even
when Democratic appointees enjoyed a substantial majority on the
Ninth Circuit, there was always a cohort of judges who were ready,
willing, and able to argue vigorously for the conservative position.
Particularly telling are the dissents from denial of en banc rehearing
written or joined by the conservative judges. Those dissents constitute
a kind of shadow jurisprudence paralleling the court’s binding
precedent.
Second, a recently published article by Professors Neal Devins and
Allison Orr Larsen argues that “today’s en banc review” has been
“weaponized” – that “the judges vote in blocs aligned by the party of the
President who appointed them and use en banc review to reverse
panels composed of members from the other team.” 25 But their study
examines only the cases in which en banc rehearing was granted. This
Article draws on a unique database that includes failed en banc calls as
well as those that were successful. By studying both grants and
denials, we can more accurately determine whether en banc review has
been “weaponized.”
The article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly traces the political
composition of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from the Carter era
to the present, emphasizing the shifts in the ratio of Democratic to
Republican appointees. Part II describes the operation of the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc process and explains why study of the court’s votes on
whether to rehear panel decisions en banc is the best way of gaining
insight into the court’s ideological orientation. Part III outlines the
method used in this study to classify the “ideological direction” of the
panel decisions that have been the subject of en banc balloting. The
classifications largely track those initially adopted by political
scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, with one major adjustment: the
analysis includes a discussion of “reverse polarity” issues – those where
support for a civil liberties claim is regarded as the conservative rather
than the liberal position.
Neal Devins & Allison Orr Larson, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1373, 1373 (2021).
25
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With the framework thus established, the core of the article
addresses the question “Is the Ninth Circuit truly a liberal court?” It
does so by studying the results of en banc balloting over the 23-year
period from 1998 through 2020. Uninterruptedly during that period,
Democratic appointees constituted a majority of the active judges; for
much of that time, Democratic appointees outnumbered Republican
appointees by a ratio of 2 to 1. If the Ninth Circuit is indeed a liberal
court, the data should show the active judges using their en banc
prerogatives to reject conservative panel decisions while preserving
those that support a liberal jurisprudence.
The results of the study can be summarized briefly. The Ninth
Circuit is a liberal court, but its liberalism is more nuanced and
selective than the conventional depictions suggest. In en banc balloting,
the liberal position prevails more often than not – but the conservative
side is not shut out. Moreover, when we look separately at the different
kinds of issues that generated en banc calls, we find a wide variation in
the extent to which the court used the en banc process to produce liberal
outcomes.
I. The Political Composition of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 1977-2022
This article is about ideology – in particular, ideology as reflected
in appellate judicial decisions. Extensive research has shown that
judicial ideology is correlated to a strong degree with the political party
of the appointing President: across a wide variety of issues, judges
appointed by Democratic Presidents reach systematically more liberal
results than those produced by Republican appointees. 26 It will

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 19 (2006) (“in a number of areas, there is
strong evidence of ideological voting in the sense that Democratic appointees are far
more likely to vote in the stereotypically liberal direction than are Republican
appointees.”); see also LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 168, 175 (2013) [hereinafter Epstein et al.,
Behavior]; Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological
Component of Judging in the Taxing Context, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1797, 1806 (2006)
(summarizing prior studies). As will be seen, this study provides further evidence of
the correlation between ideology and political affiliation.
26
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therefore be useful to trace the political composition of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals over the course of recent decades. 27
The modern history of the Ninth Circuit begins with the
presidency of Jimmy Carter. When Carter, a Democrat, took office in
January 1977, the Ninth Circuit was a 13-judge court with 11 active
judges and two vacancies. All but three of the active judges had been
appointed by Republican Presidents (Nixon and Ford). Before the year
was over, President Carter appointed two judges to fill the vacancies.
In October 1978, Congress passed an omnibus judgeship bill
creating 10 new positions for the Ninth Circuit. 28 Over the next two
years, President Carter appointed judges for all of those new positions.
He also appointed three judges to fill vacancies that opened up during
his term in office, for a total of 15 appointments to the now 23-judge
court. One appointee of President John F. Kennedy, Chief Judge James
R. Browning, remained as an active judge; the court thus had 16
Democratic appointees and 7 appointed by Republican Presidents.
That was the situation when Ronald Reagan, a Republican,
defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election. Reagan did not make
his first appointment to the Ninth Circuit until early 1984, when a
Republican appointee retired. Later in 1984, Congress passed an
omnibus judgeship bill that added five new seats to the Ninth Circuit,
making it a court of 28 judgeships. 29 Reagan – reelected in 1984 –
appointed judges for all five of the new positions. Reagan also filled
four new vacancies, including two created by retirements of Democratic
appointees. 30 The upshot is that by 1986, the court was evenly divided
between Republican and Democratic appointees, with 13 of each and
two vacancies. And in 1989, when Reagan left office, the court had a
one-judge Republican majority (14-13).
I am indebted to Sally Bingham of the Ninth Circuit Headquarters Library
and Rollins Emerson, Court of Appeals Archivist, for assistance in compiling in the
data reported in this Part. Any errors in presentation or interpretation are mine.
Unless otherwise noted, the data were calculated as of October 1 in each year.
27

28

Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1633 (1978).

29

Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title II, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).

Three Carter appointees retired in 1986, but one of the vacancies was not
filled until George H.W. Bush was President.
30
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Reagan was succeeded as President by George H.W. Bush, also a
Republican. Bush served a single term. He filled the single vacancy on
the court; he also replaced three Republican appointees. But there was
only one retirement by a Democratic appointee during his presidency,
and that was after the 1992 election, too late for Bush to fill the
vacancy. 31 When Bush left office in January 1993, the court had a
three-judge Republican majority (15-12).
Bush was defeated by Bill Clinton in the 1992 election. During
Clinton’s first term as President, he appointed only three judges to the
Ninth Circuit; all three replaced Carter judges. Meanwhile, the court
experienced an unprecedented wave of retirements. In the 22 months
from March 1995 through January 1997, seven judges took senior
status. One vacancy remained from 1994; thus, when Clinton took the
oath for his second term, there were eight vacancies on the 28-judge
court. Four of the seats had been occupied by appointees of Democratic
Presidents, four by Republican appointees. The timing of the
retirements was such that toward the end of Clinton’s first term,
Republican nominees enjoyed their largest majority in two decades; in
1995, Republican appointees outnumbered Democratic appointees, 15
to 9.
Of course, with Clinton’s reelection in 1996, the Republican
majority could not last, and it did not. 32 Over the course of four years,
Clinton filled all but one of the vacancies that existed at the time of his
second inauguration. He also filled three new vacancies created by the
retirement of Republican appointees. By 1998, Democratic appointees
were again a majority on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In total, Clinton appointed 14 judges to the Ninth Circuit – only
one fewer than Carter. And when he left office in January 2001, the
Democratic majority was even larger than it was at the end of Carter’s
In fact, there were no retirements by Democratic appointees from mid-1986
through late 1992. The number of Democratic appointees remained at 13, and the
political ratio depended entirely on retirements by Republican appointees and the
timing of their replacements by Presidents Reagan and Bush.
31

There were two additional retirements by Republican appointees in the
months following Clinton’s second inauguration in January 1997. As a result, for a
five-month period between September 1997 and February 1998, the court had only
18 active judges, evenly divided between Republican and Democratic appointees.
32

May 9, 2022

Ideology and En Banc – Page 11

term: the Ninth Circuit had 25 active judges, only seven of whom had
been appointed by Republican Presidents. To be sure, one of the
Clinton judges was a Republican: Richard C. Tallman was placed on
the court as part of a deal with Republicans in the Senate. 33 So the
effective ratio was 17 to 8 – still more than a two-to-one advantage for
the Democrat-appointed contingent.
George W. Bush, a Republican, took office in 2001. Although, like
Clinton, he served two terms as President, he made only half as many
appointments to the Ninth Circuit – a total of seven. And four of those
replaced appointees of Republican Presidents. Thus – still counting
Judge Tallman as a Republican – when Bush left office in January
2009, Democratic appointees enjoyed a three-judge majority on the
court (15 to 12).
Bush was succeeded in 2009 by Barack Obama, a Democrat. Like
Bush, Obama served for two terms, and like Bush, Obama made seven
appointments to the Ninth Circuit. He replaced three judges who had
been appointed by Republican Presidents and three who had been
appointed by Democrats; he also had the opportunity to fill a new
position created for the Ninth Circuit by an Act of Congress in 2007.34
In April 2014, with the appointment of Michelle Friedland, the Ninth
Circuit had its full complement of judges for the first time in more than
20 years. Only nine of those judges had been appointed by Republican
Presidents; counting Judge Tallman as a Republican, the Democratic
appointees constituted a majority of 19 on the 29-judge court.
But change was in the offing – and, for the first time in the court’s
modern history, the circumstances favored the Republicans. Judge
Harry Pregerson, one of the court’s most liberal judges, took senior
status in December 2015. 35 Three other judges – two Republican
See John Roemer, Let’s Make a Deal, Daily J. (S.F.), Mar. 9, 2012) (noting
that “in exchange for William Fletcher’s getting a robe, Clinton would nominate a
Republican to another vacant circuit seat”).
33

Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177 § 509 (2008).
The Act took one seat away from the D.C. Circuit.
34

President Obama nominated District Judge Lucy H. Koh to fill the Pregerson
vacancy, but the Republican-controlled Senate did not act on the nomination. Judge
Koh was renominated by President Biden in 2021. She was confirmed and took her
seat on the Ninth Circuit in December 2021.
35
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appointees and one appointed by President Clinton – announced their
retirement effective late in 2016. And, of course, in November 2016
Donald J. Trump, a Republican, was elected President.
When Trump took office in January 2017, the court had 25 active
judges – 18 Democratic appointees, including Judge Tallman, and
seven judges appointed by Republican Presidents. There were four
vacancies. Over the next three years, four more judges – three
Republican appointees and Judge Tallman – also took senior status.
Two other seats opened up unexpectedly. In December 2017, Judge
Alex Kozinski, a Republican appointee whose votes were often
idiosyncratic, resigned when he was accused of sexual harassment by
several women. Three months later, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the
“liberal lion,” died suddenly.
Although Trump got off to a slow start in filling Ninth Circuit
vacancies, he soon made up for lost time. By January 2020, the court
was once again at full strength, with 16 Democratic appointees (nine
named by Clinton, seven by Obama) and 13 Republican appointees
(three appointed by G.W. Bush and ten by Trump). We must go back to
1996 – almost 25 years earlier – to find a time when there were as
many as 13 Republican appointees on the Ninth Circuit. But
Democratic appointees still constituted a majority of the court, as they
had done without interruption for the preceding 22 years.
With Trump’s defeat by Joe Biden in the 2020 election, there will
be no additional Republican appointees for at least the next three
years. And if one or more of the G.W. Bush appointees retires, the size
of the Democratic majority will increase once again. 36
II. En Banc Balloting: A Window into Ideology
The preceding account shows that for most of the last 40 years the
Ninth Circuit has had a majority of judges who were appointed by
Democratic Presidents. Starting in 1998, dominance by Democratic
appointees has been unbroken. And judges appointed by Democratic
Presidents tend to reach more liberal results than those produced by
As of April 1, 2022, the ratio remained at 16 to 13. President Biden appointed
four new judges; all of them replaced appointees of President Clinton who took
senior status.
36
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Republican appointees. 37 But of course that generalization does not
prove that the Ninth Circuit has been a liberal court. To test that
proposition, one must consider not who the judges are, but what the
judges do. In this study, I examine how the judges have voted on
whether to rehear panel decisions en banc. This aspect of the en banc
process is, in Justice Holmes’s phrase, the “point of contact – the place
where the boy [gets] his fingers pinched.” 38 Studying the outcomes of
that process is the best way of gaining insight into the ideological
orientation of the court.
In this Part, I explain why that is so. I also describe the unique en
banc ballot database that I used to carry out the research reported in
this Article.
A. The En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit, as in the other courts of appeals, cases are
ordinarily heard and decided by randomly composed panels of three
judges. 39 These panels will always include at least one active judge of
the Ninth Circuit; 40 they may also include Ninth Circuit senior judges
as well as visiting judges from district courts and courts of appeals
throughout the country. 41 Panel decisions are binding on later panels
unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the Ninth Circuit sitting
en banc. 42

37

See supra note 26.

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter, Dec. 19, 1915, in
Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston, Holmes and Frankfurter: Their
Correspondence, 1912-1934 at 40 (1996).
38

See generally Judith A. McKenna, Laural L. Hooper, & Mary Clark, Case
Management Procedures in the Federal Courts of Appeals (Federal Judicial Center
2000).
39

40

See 9th Cir. General Order 3.2(a).

For a detailed examination of the role of visiting judges, see Stephen L.
Wasby, Borrowed Judges: Visitors in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2018).
41

See, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 883 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 2018) (“we
are bound to follow prior precedent unless it is overruled by this Court sitting en
banc or by the Supreme Court”).
42
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As this last observation suggests, Congress has also authorized the
court of appeals to hear or rehear cases “before the court [en] banc.” 43
En banc rehearing will be granted if a majority of the nonrecused active
judges vote to do so. 44 In other circuits, the en banc court consists of all
active judges. 45 The Ninth Circuit, acting under the authority of a 1978
statute, convenes a “limited en banc court” (LEBC) composed of the
chief judge and ten other judges selected at random for each case. 46
There are two ways of initiating the process that can lead to
rehearing by a limited en banc court. 47 The party who lost at the panel
level may file a petition for rehearing en banc (PFREB). 48 The petition
is circulated to all active judges and to senior judges who have chosen
to participate in the process. In the overwhelming majority of cases, no
judge calls for rehearing, and the panel’s disposition becomes final.49
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1998). The statute uses the spelling “in banc,” as did the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure until the 1998 revision.
43
44

Id; see also Fed. R. App. Proc. 35(a).

Senior judges may sit on the en banc court if they served as a member of the
panel that decided the case. See id.
45

For background on the 1978 legislation, see Arthur D. Hellman, Deciding Who
Decides: Understanding the Realities of Judicial Reform, 15 Law & Soc. Inquiry 343,
346-51 (1990). For a detailed account of the deliberations that led to the
establishment of the limited en banc court, see Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining
Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in Restructuring Justice 62-70 (Arthur
D. Hellman ed., 1990) [hereinafter Hellman, Maintaining Consistency]. For an 18month period in 2006-07 the size of the LEBC was increased to 15 judges. See John
Roemer, Kozinski’s 9th Circuit Jumps Into the En Banc Business, Daily J., Apr. 3,
2008 (noting that court returned to 11-judge LEBC in 2007).
46

For more detailed descriptions of the en banc process, see Hellman,
Maintaining Consistency, supra note 46, at 70-73; Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals En Bancs, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 17, 19-33 (2001). Slight
changes have been made in the Ninth Circuit’s process over the years, but the basic
framework has remained.
47

Until the 1998 amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
litigants filed a petition for rehearing with a “suggestion” for rehearing en banc. For
convenience, I will use the current terminology even though a few of the cases
discussed in this Article were governed by the pre-1998 version of the rule.
48

See United States Courts, Ninth Circuit Annual Report 2020 at 60 (reporting
that from 2016 to 2020 the number of PFREBs filed annually ranged from 810 to
955; the number of en banc ballots sent to the judges ranged from 17 to 33),
AnnualReport2020.pdf (uscourts.gov).
49
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But if any judge calls for a vote, the en banc balloting process will begin
with an exchange of memoranda supporting or opposing en banc
rehearing. Sometimes only one or two memoranda are circulated; other
cases generate a lengthy back-and-forth or draw comments from
multiple judges. 50
In the alternative, a judge may call for a vote even though no party
has requested it. The process is similar, except that ordinarily the
exchange of memoranda will not begin until after the parties have been
asked to state their position on whether rehearing should be granted. 51
When the exchange of memoranda has been completed, a vote will
be held, and if a majority of the nonrecused active judges agree to
rehearing, the chief judge will enter an order taking the case en banc.
Two other things will happen immediately: the panel decision will be
vacated and deprived of precedential status, 52 and a limited en banc
court will be chosen, with ten names drawn at random from among the
eligible judges. 53 Thereafter, the LEBC will control all proceedings in
the case. Unless some event occurs that moots the controversy, the
LEBC will issue a new opinion. Research has shown that in a
substantial majority of cases, the LEBC reaches a different result from
that of the panel. 54
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the
criteria for en banc rehearing: rehearing may be ordered when en banc
See Hellman, Maintaining Consistency, supra note 46, at 72; Stephen L.
Wasby, Why Sit En Banc? 63 Hastings L.J. 747, 749 (2012). Professor Wasby’s
article includes extensive quotations from these en banc memoranda.
50

51

See 9th Cir. General Order 5.4(c)(3).

See, e.g., Marinelarena v. Barr, 930 F.3d 1039, 1044 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2019) (en
banc) (noting that “[t]he order granting rehearing en banc effectively vacated the
three-judge panel opinion”).
52

Eligible judges are: (a) all active judges who are not recused and (b) senior
judges who were members of the panel and who elected to have their names placed
in the draw. See [9th] Cir. Advisory Committee Note to Rules 35-1 to 35-3, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ninth Circuit Rules, Circuit Advisory Committee
Notes (uscourts.gov). The chief judge always sits on the LEBC unless recused.
53

Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 425, 456 (2000) (49 cases
out of 65) [hereinafter Hellman, Getting It Right].
54

May 9, 2022

Ideology and En Banc – Page 16

consideration “is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the
court’s decisions” or where “the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.” However, prior research has shown that, in
practice, judges generally vote for en banc rehearing because they “do
not like the panel’s ruling.” 55 Consistent with that finding, the
memoranda in support of rehearing “almost invariably argue that the
panel opinion is erroneous.” 56 Many of the arguments align with
familiar liberal or conservative themes. 57
That is not to say that judges ignore Rule 35’s criterion of
“importance.” On the contrary, judges generally vote in favor of en banc
rehearing only when they believe both that the panel ruling is very
wrong and that the decision has a significance beyond that of the
ordinary appeal, either as precedent or because of its practical
consequences. 58 But even if perception of panel error is not a sufficient
justification for a “yes” vote, it is generally necessary. 59
This description shows why study of the en banc process can tell
us so much about the ideological orientation of the Ninth Circuit. En
banc balloting involves the participation of all of the court’s active
judges. 60 When those judges vote on an en banc call, they are deciding
Wasby, supra note 50, at 757. See also Hellman, Getting It Right, supra note
54, at 455 (except in rare situations, “judges who vote for en banc rehearing
generally believe that the panel decision is wrong, or at least that it is open to
serious question”).
55

Hellman, Getting It Right, supra note 54, at 455 n. 104. “This is so even when
one or more supporting memoranda also assert that the opinion creates an
intracircuit conflict.” Id. Professor Wasby provides numerous examples of the
different ways in which judges, in memoranda supporting en banc rehearing, argue,
in substance, that the panel “got it very wrong.” Wasby, supra note 50, at 757-64.
56

This can be seen in published dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, many
of which are quoted in this Article. Those dissents are generally based on the
memoranda circulated within the court. See infra text accompanying note 66.
Professor Wasby’s article also provides examples. See Wasby, supra note 50, passim.
57

See Arthur D. Hellman, “The Law of the Circuit” Revisited: What Role for
Majority Rule? 32 S. Ill. L.J. 625, 635-39 (2008).
58

The discussion here is limited to cases in which a three-judge panel has
already issued a decision. See text infra for discussion of other cases.
59

To be sure, judges sometimes refrain from voting. But except in death penalty
cases, failure to vote is considered a “no” vote. See 9th Cir. General Orders 5.5(b).
60
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whether to allow the panel opinion to stand as the law of the circuit or
to convene a different (and larger) group of judges who will consider the
case afresh – and who probably will reach a different result. 61 In
casting their votes, the judges give heavy weight to their view of the
correctness of the panel ruling. By comparing how liberal and
conservative panel decisions fare at the hands of the full array of active
judges, we can determine whether the Ninth Circuit deserves the
“liberal” label that has so often been attached to it.
There are, to be sure, other ways in which one might try to
determine whether the Ninth Circuit is a liberal court. In particular,
one might look at the decisions made by the court sitting en banc. That
approach would make sense in other circuits, where the en banc court
consists of all active judges. But as already noted, in the Ninth Circuit,
en banc cases are heard by a “limited en banc court” consisting of the
chief judge and 10 other judges selected at random. The only decision
made by the full complement of active judges is the determination
whether to take a case en banc. Examining the results of en banc
balloting is therefore the most reliable method for assessing the
ideology of the court as a whole. 62
Of course, that does not mean that study of LEBC outcomes
cannot contribute to our understanding of the Ninth Circuit’s
ideological orientation. It certainly can. In this Article I shall provide
extensive data on what happened in the cases where the en banc call
was successful. 63
61

See supra note 54.

Assessing ideology by looking at the en banc decisions themselves is also more
difficult, as examples in Part IV will illustrate. A case may present multiple issues
with different outcomes. The court may reach a result that is intermediate among
those available. Or the court may be fragmented, with no single position
commanding a majority. In contrast, the vote on taking a case en banc is a binary
choice – thumbs up or thumbs down for rehearing the panel decision.
62

Other methods of assessing the liberalism of the Ninth Circuit would involve
comparing Ninth Circuit outcomes in particular classes of cases with outcomes in
other circuits. For example, do aliens seeking asylum win a higher percentage of
appeals in the Ninth Circuit than elsewhere? Pursuing research along those lines
would be a resource-intensive undertaking, and the results might not be convincing.
Not only would you have to look at multiple areas of the law; you would have to
consider circuit-specific variables that might affect the pattern of case outcomes.
63
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Four other aspects of the en banc process deserve mention. First,
judges may call for a vote on en banc rehearing before a panel has
issued its decision. Typically, this occurs when the panel members
discover a conflict in the court’s precedents; the panel itself issues the
en banc call. 64 Since the full court in these cases is not voting on a
disposition already reached by a three-judge panel, this class of cases
will be treated only briefly in this Article.
Second, when an en banc call fails, the General Orders provide
that “the panel shall resume control of the case and no further en banc
action is required.” 65 Nevertheless, one or more of the judges who voted
in favor of en banc reconsideration may publish an opinion dissenting
from the denial of rehearing. And judges who voted against rehearing
may publish opinions defending the panel ruling. These opinions are
generally based on the internal memoranda that were circulated before
the vote, and they provide further confirmation that the vote on
rehearing is heavily influenced by the judges’ view of the correctness of
the panel decision. 66
Third, the General Orders provide that after the LEBC has
rendered its decision, a party may file a petition for rehearing by the
full court, and a judge may request a vote on full-court rehearing. 67 In
more than four decades under the LEBC regime, there have been only
eight cases in which a judge has made such a request. All of the calls

See, e.g., United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (noting that three-judge panel sua sponte called for rehearing en banc to
resolve intracircuit conflict over proper standard of review of district court’s
application of Sentencing Guidelines to particular facts).
64

65

See 9th Cir. General Order 5.5(c).

See, e.g., Biel v. St. James School, 926 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2019) (R. Nelson,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“In this case, five different amici …
urge this court to correct its legal error.”), panel decision revd sub nom. Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020); Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, 910 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2019) (Ikuta, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“In reaching [its] conclusion, the panel
made crucial factual and legal errors”), panel decision revd sub nom. Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021). See also infra Part IV
(quoting extensively from dissents from denial of rehearing).
66

67

9th Cir. General Orders 5.8.
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have failed. Four of the calls sought rehearing of a liberal decision by
the LEBC; 68 four challenged a conservative decision. 69
Finally, a word about the role of senior judges in the en banc
process. Senior judges cannot vote on an en banc call, nor can they
write or join a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. However,
they can request a vote on whether to rehear a case en banc, and if the
vote fails they can publish opinions “respecting” the denial. 70
B. The En Banc Ballot Database
Notwithstanding the importance of the process to the court, little
information about en banc activity has been made available to the
public. The annual reports of the Administrative Office of United
States Courts include information about the number of cases decided
by an en banc court, but those numbers have not always been reliable.
In 2009, the annual report of the Ninth Circuit provided raw numbers,
going back to 1996, for en banc ballots circulated, grants of rehearing
after a vote, and denials after a vote. 71 Successive annual reports have
continued to include those numbers, but no other information.
As for the cases themselves, orders granting en banc rehearing are
published, as are opinions of the en banc court. But until 2018, if the
vote failed and there was neither an opinion dissenting from denial of
rehearing nor an amendment to the panel opinion, the fact that a vote
was taken would not be announced, and the public would ordinarily

See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir.
1996) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of full-court rehearing). The Supreme
Court later reversed the LEBC decision sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997).
68

See, e.g., Abebe v. Holder, 577 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting from denial of full-court rehearing).
69

See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, etc. Litigation, 13 F.4th
990 (9th Cir.2021) (noting that senior judge requested vote); Kennedy v. Bremerton
Sch. Dist, 4 F.4th 910, 930 n.1 (9th Cir. 2021) (opinion of O’Scannlain, J.) (noting
that under court’s general orders, senior judges “may participate in discussions of en
banc proceedings”).
70

United States Courts, Ninth Circuit Annual Report 2009, at 44,
AnnualReport2009.pdf (uscourts.gov)
71
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have no way of knowing that the case had been the subject of a ballot. 72
Even today – in contrast to the practice in some other circuits 73 – orders
denying rehearing after a ballot do not reveal the actual tally of votes,
let alone identify how each judge voted. 74
In part through my work on various court projects, I acquired
materials that I used to compile a database of en banc ballot cases from
1974 to the present. That database, which I believe to be substantially
complete, enabled me to carry out the research reported in this
Article. 75
III. Identifying “Ideological Direction”
This study examines the role of ideology in en banc activity in the
Ninth Circuit. To pursue that inquiry, it is necessary to classify the
“ideological direction” of the panel decisions that were the subject of en
banc ballots. That is, was the panel decision liberal or conservative – or
perhaps something else?
For many, probably most, issues of federal law, there is
widespread agreement as to what constitutes the “liberal” or the
“conservative” position. For example, in 2013, three prominent scholars
of judicial behavior summarized some of the “conventional
The orders denying rehearing were sometimes available on PACER, but those
who wished to learn about them had no way of finding the orders without searching
the dockets for individual cases. If the losing party sought Supreme Court review,
the order would be included in the appendix to the certiorari petition.
72

See, e.g., Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 2 F.4th 506 (5th Cir. 2021) (listing judges
who voted for and against en banc rehearing); United States v. Johnson, 833 Fed.
Appx. 522 (4th Cir. 2021) (listing judges who voted for and against en banc
rehearing); Hildreth v. Butler, 971 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2020) (listing judges who voted
to grant rehearing en banc); Barnes v. Security Life of Denver Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 704
(10th Cir. 2020) (listing judges who voted to grant en banc rehearing).
73

The late Judge Stephen Reinhardt repeatedly argued that this information
should be made public. See, e.g., Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“the public has a right
to know how close the vote was and how each of us exercised our judicial
responsibilities”).
74

I am grateful to Staff Attorney Paul Keller of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals for providing some of the case information that I used to compile the
database.
75
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understandings” of the terms “liberal” and “conservative” in the context
of judicial votes and decisions. 76 They wrote:
“Liberal” votes [include] those in favor of defendants
in criminal cases; of women and minorities in civil rights
cases; of individuals in suits against the government in
First Amendment, privacy, and due process cases; of
unions and individuals over businesses; and of
government over businesses. “Conservative” votes are the
reverse. 77

Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt sketched a similar
approach in an article published in 1997. 78 Judge Reinhardt set out to
answer the question, “what is a liberal judge?” Making clear that he
included himself in the category, he wrote:
Liberal judges believe in a generous or expansive
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. … We believe that the
Founding Fathers used broad general principles to
describe our rights, terms such as “due process of law,”
“life, liberty, and property,” “unreasonable search and
seizure,” “freedom of speech,” because they were
determined not to enact a narrow, rigid code that would
bind and limit generations to come. …
Liberal judges tend to take very seriously the idea
that the Constitution protects the rights of individuals
against arbitrary and oppressive state action, as well as
the rights of minorities against a tyrannical majority. …
Epstein et al., Behavior, supra note 26, at 76; Professor Epstein and her
colleagues were discussing the ideological coding in the U.S. Supreme Court
Database originally created by Professor Harold Spaeth. See Arthur D. Hellman,
The Supreme Court’s Two Constitutions: A First Look at the “Reverse Polarity” Cases,
82 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 273, 286-87 (2020) [hereinafter Hellman, Reverse Polarity].
76

Epstein et al., Behavior, supra note 26, at 76. The authors questioned some of
the Database classifications of individual cases, id. at 76-77, but they appear to have
generally accepted the “conventional understandings” of what “liberal” and
“conservative” mean when applied to judicial decisions or votes. However, they
rejected Spaeth’s treatment of two types of civil liberties cases – those involving
commercial speech and those involving requirements of “accountability in campaign
spending.” Id. at 150. For discussion of these issue areas, see Hellman, Reverse
Polarity, supra note 76, at 306-11.
77

78

Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Judges, Fed. Law, Feb. 1997, at 46.
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[Laws and voter initiatives] must be strictly tested
against the limitations and guaranties contained in the
Constitution. 79

Although Judge Reinhardt was describing liberal judges, his
analysis necessarily incorporated a definition of liberal judicial
decisions. For example, liberal decisions are those that reflect “a
generous or expansive interpretation of the Bill of Rights” and eschew
narrow or rigid readings of “broad general principles” such as “due
process of law” and “freedom of speech.”
Judge Reinhardt also identified some “nonconstitutional areas
where you can spot the liberal judge at work.” 80 The liberal judge, he
said, more readily rules in favor of “the injured worker or the disabled
individual” rather than the insurance company or employer or
government agency. Liberal judges “are frequently a fairly soft touch”
for aliens seeking asylum. “In all types of cases, including tax cases,
you’re more likely to find the liberal judge voting for the individual
while his conservative colleagues tend to uphold the position advocated
by the government.” 81
The descriptions in the 2013 book and Judge Reinhardt’s article
would probably suffice to classify the ideological direction of most of the
panel decisions that were the subject of en banc ballots in the Ninth
Circuit. Most – but not all. As I have described elsewhere, there is
mounting evidence that the traditional assumptions about the liberalconservative divide are incorrect or at best incomplete. 82 In at least
some areas of constitutional law, the traditional characterizations have
been reversed. Across a wide variety of constitutional issues, support
for claims under the Bill of Rights or the Reconstruction Amendments
Reinhardt, supra note 78, at 47-48. Judge Reinhardt did signal, albeit
obliquely, one departure from this general approach. He said that liberal judges
“sometimes have trouble interpreting [the post-Civil War constitutional]
amendments as barriers to minority advancement.” The implication is that liberal
judges do not apply “strict[]” tests to government programs that they regard as
promoting affirmative action for minorities. For discussion, see Hellman, Reverse
Polarity, supra note 76, at 304-06; infra Part IV.G.1.
79

80

Reinhardt, supra note 78, at 48.

81

Id.

82

Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76.
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is now regarded as the conservative position. I refer to these as reverse
polarity issues.
Apart from reverse polarity, for purposes of this study I wanted to
rely as much as possible on objective criteria and to use transparent
methods that could be replicated by other scholars. To that end, I used
a modified version of the case classification system that I developed
initially for studies of the Supreme Court and later used for studies of
the federal appellate courts (particularly the Ninth Circuit). 83 That
system is built upon three key elements:
• Four broad (macro) issue categories, each corresponding to one
of the major functions of the federal courts in the life and law of
America, and rank-ordered to reflect the hierarchy in the legal
effect of decisions in each area. The categories are: civil liberties,
federalism and separation of powers, general federal law, and
federal jurisdiction and procedure. 84
• Particularized (micro) issue categories defined by reference to
the source of authority for the legal rule in dispute – for
example, a clause in the Bill of Rights or a statutory scheme like
Title VII.
• Polarity (plus/minus) codes that are keyed to the issue and
describe case outcomes, with a “plus” signifying that the court
ruled in favor of the claim or defense based on the source of the
legal rule in dispute.
Those studies, however, did not consider ideology. To classify the
ideological direction of the panel decisions that were the subject of an
en banc ballot, I proceeded incrementally. I began by analyzing the
cases in subject matter areas characterized by two features: (a) the
traditional ideological alignment is well established, and (b) ideological
direction coincides with issue polarity. For example, on issues of
constitutional criminal procedure, a decision favoring the constitutional
See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the
Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970’s, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1709,
1716, 1737-89 (1978).
83

In this Article, the terms “civil liberties,” “civil rights,” and “individual rights”
will be used interchangeably to refer to the first category.
84
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claim is liberal; a decision rejecting the claim is conservative. This
method, without more, enabled me to determine the ideological
direction of at least two-thirds of the panel decisions in the study.
Based on that work, I was also able to identify liberal and
conservative blocs among the judges on the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Using that information – along with earlier studies of judicial
behavior and information about the positions taken by the liberal and
conservative blocs on the United States Supreme Court during the last
quarter-century – I ascertained the ideological direction of panel
decisions on other issues of federal law. 85
Overwhelmingly, the classifications used in this Article conform to
the “conventional understandings” of liberal and conservative positions
sketched above.
Debatable classifications will be discussed in
connection with particular issues or cases. 86
IV. Ideology and En Banc Review: The Results of the Study
As already noted, prior research has shown that judges generally
vote for en banc rehearing because they “do not like the panel’s
ruling.” 87 If the Ninth Circuit is indeed the liberal bastion that it is
reputed to be, this liberal stance should be reflected in the operation of
the en banc balloting process. The members of the liberal majority
would use their numerical advantage to push the law in a liberal
direction. They would do this in two principal ways. They would grant
en banc rehearing of panel decisions that reached conservative
outcomes. They would deny rehearing when conservative judges
challenged panel decisions that reached liberal outcomes. This study
tests whether that is what has happened.
The study encompasses the period from 1998 through 2020. For
the entirety of that period, Democratic appointees constituted a
The information on ideological positions in the Supreme Court was taken
from Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, and LAWRENCE BAUM, IDEOLOGY IN
THE SUPREME COURT (2017).
85

For a more detailed exposition of the method, see Arthur D. Hellman,
Mapping the Ideological Divide in the Federal Courts: A Legal and Empirical
Approach for an Era of Shifting Alignments (forthcoming).
86

87

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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majority of the active judges; for much of that time, Democratic
appointees outnumbered Republican appointees by a ratio of 2 to 1. 88
The Ninth is the only one of the federal judicial circuits that has had a
majority of Democratic appointees throughout the twenty-first century.
In the 23 years of the study period, there were more than 800
cases in which the active judges voted on an en banc call. 89 However, in
about 35 cases the call came from the panel before the panel had issued
its opinion. By definition, these are not cases in which the full court is
considering the merits of the panel’s decision. Moreover, the reason for
the call generally is that the panel has identified an apparent conflict
in circuit precedents. 90 Judges might well vote in favor of en banc
hearing irrespective of their view of the merits. These cases are
therefore excluded from the study group, leaving about 780 cases in
which the full court voted on whether to rehear a decision by a threejudge panel. 91
Even when the judges are voting on whether to rehear a panel
decision, not all cases implicate ideology. Intellectual property disputes,
for example, generally do not. 92 Nor do many cases involving civil
procedure or bankruptcy law issues. Rather than pick and choose
among cases, I decided to limit the study to two large categories that
offered the best prospect of shedding light on the Ninth Circuit’s
For one month at the start of 1998, the court was evenly divided between
Republican and Democratic appointees. See supra note 32.
88

This number may not reflect all of the cases in which the court voted on en
banc rehearing. As noted in Part II, until 2018, if the vote failed and there was
neither an opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing nor an amendment to the
panel opinion, the fact that a vote was taken would not be announced, and the public
would ordinarily have no way of knowing that the case had been the subject of a
ballot. See supra Part II-B. I believe that the database I have compiled includes
substantially all of the cases in which an en banc ballot took place. Out of caution,
the numbers in this paragraph of text are given as an approximation.
89

90

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

In one case, the panel requested en banc hearing after issuing its opinion, and
the issue decided by the LEBC was one that did not exist at the time the panel
ruled. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
That case is also excluded from the study because the request did not call into
question the correctness of the panel’s decision.
91

92

See infra note 392 and accompanying text.
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ideological orientation with a minimum of disputation over method: (a)
civil liberties cases and (b) areas of statutory law in which ideological
direction can generally be readily classified through simple objective
criteria.
This does mean that some cases with clear ideological valence
were excluded from the study. But their number was small, and any
gain in understanding would have been outweighed by the need to
make and explain judgments not only about ideological direction but
also about how cases are to be grouped. 93 In the end, the study group
included more than 90% of the en banc calls targeting panel decisions –
more than 700 cases.
To determine what the votes in these cases tell us about the
ideological orientation of the Ninth Circuit, I begin with four areas in
which the “conventional understandings” of the liberal and the
conservative position are especially well established. I then turn to
areas in which category boundaries or ideological alignments may
require some discussion.
A. Constitutional Criminal Procedure
The largest single component of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc
balloting docket – about 30% of the total – consists of cases involving
issues of constitutional criminal procedure. This category includes the
rights of criminal defendants, limitations on police practices, and the
availability of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. 94 Most of the
cases involve claims under the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause; some involve procedural issues,
particularly those generated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the federal habeas corpus statute. The
disputes arise primarily in three different contexts: federal criminal
prosecutions, civil rights actions under section 1983 or Bivens, and
federal collateral challenges to state convictions.
The excluded cases were of two kinds. First, there were the issue areas in
which many or most decisions lack ideological valence. Second, there were the cases
involving federalism or separation of powers and not implicating “economic
liberalism.” On “economic liberalism,” see infra Part IV.H.
93

The category includes all Fourth Amendment cases, whether or not the
particular search or seizure was carried out for purposes of law enforcement.
94
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The cases in this group are important in their own right; they also
serve as a useful starting-point for examining the ideological valence of
the en banc process during the study period. That is so because there is
no area of federal law in which the traditional ideological alignment is
more firmly established than constitutional criminal procedure. This
can be seen most readily in the work of the United States Supreme
Court. In the quarter century starting in 1994, the Court considered
more than 300 cases of this kind; there were only four in which the
constitutional claim received more support from conservative Justices
than from the liberals. 95 Thus, “on the broad range of issues ranging
from searches and seizures to the administration of the death penalty,
support for the constitutional claim remains the liberal, not the
conservative, position.”
In the 23 years of the Ninth Circuit study, 234 panel decisions
involving issues of constitutional criminal procedure were the subject of
en banc ballots. (See Table 1.) Of these, 131 were cases in which the
panel ruled adversely to the constitutional claim, either directly or on
procedural grounds. Those decisions were classified as “conservative.”
The other cases (excluding one that resisted categorization) were
deemed “liberal”; the ruling supported the constitutional claim. 96
Of the 131 en banc calls generated by a conservative panel
decision, 71 were successful, for a grant rate of 54%. Of the 102 calls
generated by a liberal panel decision, only 34 were successful, for a
grant rate of 34%. To put it another way, an en banc call challenging a
conservative panel decision had a better than even chance of
succeeding. If the panel decision was liberal, the odds were two to one
against success.
95

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 330-33.

The case that resisted characterization is United States v. Enas, 204 F.3d 915
(9th Cir. 2000), on reh’g en banc 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001). The panel decision
rejected the defendant’s double jeopardy claim. Ordinarily, that holding would be
classified as conservative. But the decision was grounded in a broad construction of
“the inherent sovereign power of [Indian] tribes.” 204 F.3d at 920. Rulings favorable
to tribal power are regarded as liberal. Moreover, the panel was composed of three
very liberal judges (Harry Pregerson and William A. Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit,
joined by Myron Bright of the Eighth Circuit). Taking all of this into account, I
declined to classify the ideological direction of the panel opinion. But Enas was the
only constitutional-criminal case to present that dilemma.
96
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Table 1
En Banc Ballots: Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Total

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

Conservative Panel Decision

131

71

60

54%

Liberal Panel Decision

102

34

68

33%

Other Panel Decision

1

1

0

100%

234

106

128

45%

Total

The conspicuously higher success rate for en banc calls challenging
conservative panel decisions supports the hypothesis that the Ninth
Circuit is a predominantly liberal court. At the same time, the data
strongly refute the idea that the Ninth Circuit is a “reliably liberal”
court. 97 A substantial number of liberal panel decisions were reheard
by an en banc court, and almost half of the conservative panel decisions
were allowed to stand when the en banc call failed.
Those are the broad findings. A more granular look at the en banc
balloting cases is now in order, starting with the cases in which the en
banc call was successful.
1. Cases in which en banc rehearing was granted
The successful en banc calls included 71 cases in which the panel
decision favored the conservative side and 34 with a panel decision that
was liberal. I begin with the cases in which the full court voted to
rehear a conservative panel decision. These cases spanned the range of
constitutional issues, but three areas of federal law accounted for
almost two-thirds of the total. There were 17 cases on Fourth
Amendment rights, 12 on the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, and 15 that involved various aspects of the federal habeas
corpus statutes. 98

97

See supra text accompanying note 14 (quoting the New York Times).

Lists of the cases included in the various categories discussed in this Article
are on file with the author. In the interest of saving space, I have generally not
identified the cases constituting the categories, except where no more than two or
three were involved.
98
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The grant of en banc rehearing is of course an intermediate step;
the LEBC must then hear and decide the case. Although this Article
does not focus on the work of the LEBC, I did collect basic information
about whether the LEBC decision resulted in a modification of the
disposition reached by the panel. This analysis reveals that in 39 of the
71 cases, en banc rehearing resulted in a reversal of ideological
direction: a conservative panel decision was replaced by a liberal en
banc ruling. Thus, where the panel affirmed a conviction, the LEBC
reversed it. 99 Where the panel denied relief to a habeas petitioner, the
LEBC granted it. 100 Where the panel affirmed the dismissal of a § 1983
claim, the LEBC allowed the case to go forward. 101
These are the cases that most strongly support the
characterization of the Ninth Circuit as a liberal court. Yet even as to
these cases, the evidence is more equivocal than the reversals of
ideological direction by the LEBC, in isolation, might suggest. During
the period of the study, the Supreme Court was quite hospitable to
certiorari petitions filed by governments and government officials
seeking to overturn liberal decisions on criminal justice issues. 102 But
in 15 of the 39 cases – about two-fifths – the losing government party
did not even seek review by the High Court. In 14 cases the
governmental party’s certiorari petition was denied. The Court granted
review in only 8 of the 36 cases. Six were reversed; in the other two, the
en banc decision was affirmed in whole or in substantial part. 103 In one
E.g., United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 224 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2000), on reh’g
en banc, 269 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
99

E.g., Chein v. Shumsky, 323 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2003), on rehearing en banc,
373 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2004).
100

E.g., Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, 715 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2013), on rehearing
en banc, 747 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2014).
101

See, e.g., Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayor and the Supreme Court’s
Certiorari Process, 123 Yale L.J. F. 551, 562 (2014) (noting the “steady trickle of
cases” in which “the Court has been granting certiorari and summarily reversing
decisions favorable to criminal defendants and habeas petitioners”).
102

The reversals were Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21 (2014) (summary reversal);
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012); Cullen v. Pinholser, 563 U.S. 170
(2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465
(2007); and Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005). The affirmances were City of Los
Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015); and Safford Unif. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,
103
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additional case the Supreme Court GVR’d for reconsideration in light of
an intervening decision, the LEBC adhered to its liberal ruling, and
certiorari was denied. 104 Based on this record, one might conclude that
the outliers here generally were not the liberal en banc rulings but the
conservative panel decisions that were vacated upon the grant of en
banc rehearing. But even if that conclusion is correct, what we see here
does exemplify the Ninth Circuit’s using the en banc process to thwart
conservative panel outcomes.
In a majority of the remaining cases with a conservative outcome
in the panel, the LEBC decision, although not entirely reversing the
ideological direction of the panel ruling, tempered the holding so that it
was less conservative. For example:
• In a § 1983 action, the panel held that police use of a Taser did
not constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; the
LEBC held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged an excessive
force claim, but that the defendant officers were protected by
qualified immunity. 105

557 U.S. 364 (2009) (affirming on Fourth Amendment issue but reversing denial of
qualified immunity).
See Sessoms v. Grounds, 776 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (on remand),
cert. denied, 577 U.S. 913 (2015). In a second GVR of a liberal LEBC decision, the
LEBC remanded the case to the three-judge panel, which ruled against the
defendant. See United States v. Briones, 1 F.4th 1204 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc)
(remanding to three-judge panel), on remand, 18 F.4th 1170 (2021) (affirming
sentence of life without possibility of parole). Briones is noteworthy in that the
dissent from the conservative panel opinion was authored by Judge Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, the leader of the court’s conservative wing. See United States v.
Briones, 890 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); see infra
Part IV.A.2.
104

For a general discussion of GVRs, see Arthur D. Hellman, “Granted, Vacated,
and Remanded” – Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court Practice, 67
Judicature 389 (1984); Stephen L. Wasby, Case Consolidation and GVRs in the
Supreme Court, 53 U. Pac. L. Rev. 83 (2021).
See Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2010), on rehearing en
banc sub nom. Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011).
105
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• In a criminal case, the panel held that a jury instruction did not
violate due process; the LEBC held that the instruction violated
due process, but that the violation was harmless error. 106
• In another criminal case, the panel held that border patrol
agents had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants’
vehicles; the LEBC agreed with that ultimate conclusion but
overruled precedents holding that Hispanic appearance could be
considered as a factor even in the absence of “particularized,
individual suspicion.” 107
• In a prisoner case, the panel held that a claim challenging
prison disciplinary proceedings was not cognizable under the
federal habeas statute; the LEBC endorsed that conclusion but
allowed the district court to construe the habeas petition as
pleading a cause of action under § 1983. 108
In 13 cases the LEBC, like the panel, reached a conservative
outcome. 109 In six of these the LEBC was sharply divided, suggesting
that but for the luck of the draw the en banc ruling might have been
liberal rather than conservative. 110
The cases discussed thus far conform to the stereotype of the
Ninth Circuit: conservative panel rulings were vacated upon the grant
of rehearing en banc. Although the randomly chosen members of the
See United States v. Smith, 520 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008), on rehearing en
banc, 561 F.3d 934 (2009). Five judges would have held that the error was not
harmless. See 561 F.3d at 942 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
106

See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 177 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 1999), on
rehearing en banc, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000); see id. at 1131-35 & n.22.
107

Nettles v. Grounds, 788 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2015), on rehearing en banc, 830
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2016). Five judges would have allowed the prisoner to pursue his
habeas claim. See 830 F.3d at 938 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
108

In two cases the LEBC did not decide the merits of any issue resolved by the
three-judge panel.
109

E.g., Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (6-5 decision)
(on habeas corpus, rejecting challenge to imposition of death penalty); Murdoch v.
Castro, 609 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (6-5 decision) (on habeas corpus,
rejecting Confrontation Clause claim); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (9-6 decision) (on habeas corpus, rejecting challenge to death sentence
based on juror misconduct).
110
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LEBC did not always reach a liberal result, the votes of the full court
favored the liberal side.
Of greater interest are the 34 liberal panel decisions that the full
court voted to rehear en banc. As with the conservative panel decisions,
Fourth Amendment issues held pride of place; they accounted for 11 of
the cases. Seven cases involved the right to counsel. No other issue
gave rise to more than three of the en banc calls.
Two things stand out about these cases. First, many of the panel
opinions were authored by the Ninth Circuit’s most liberal judges.
Second, in 70% of the cases (24 out of 34), rehearing by the LEBC
resulted in a conservative outcome, reversing the ideological direction
of the panel decision. And in half of the remaining cases, the LEBC
decision tempered the liberalism of the panel in one way or another.
Here are some examples of the first pattern.
In Lambright v. Stewart, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, joined by
Judge Warren J. Ferguson, held that two capital defendants were
deprived of their constitutional rights when the Arizona trial court
used “dual juries” (one for each of them) in a single trial. 111 The full
court granted en banc rehearing, and the LEBC rejected the
constitutional claim on a 10-1 vote, with only Judge Reinhardt
dissenting. 112
In another capital habeas case, Judge Reinhardt joined Judge
Sidney R. Thomas in holding that the defendant was denied his right to
the effective assistance of counsel at the penalty stage. 113 The LEBC,
with only Judge Thomas dissenting, found that the petitioner was not
entitled to habeas relief on any of his claims. 114
Lambright v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1999). Judge David R.
Thompson, a Republican appointee, dissented.
111

Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Judge
Ferguson was not a member of the LEBC, but five Democratic appointees joined the
majority opinion.
112

113

Mann v. Ryan, 774 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir 2014).

Mann v. Ryan, 828 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2016). Two Democrat-appointed
judges concluded that counsel’s performance was deficient but that the errors were
not prejudicial. Id. at 1173 (Christen, J., joined by Berzon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Five other Democratic appointees joined the LEBC opinion in
full.
114
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In a § 1983 case, Judge Reinhardt joined Judge A. Wallace
Tashima in allowing a plaintiff to pursue an excessive force claim based
on a city’s policy of training its police dogs to “bite and hold”
individuals. 115 By a vote of 10 to 1, the LEBC held that the suit was
properly dismissed. 116 Judge Thomas was again the only dissenter.
During the brief period when the LEBC was expanded from 11 to
15, a liberal panel decision was rejected by a vote of 14 to 1. The panel
majority, composed of Judges Ferguson and Harry Pregerson, had set
aside a death sentence on habeas corpus. 117 The LEBC dismissed the
appeal on the ground that the prisoner had validly waived further
proceedings. 118 Judge Pregerson was the only dissenter.
This is not to say that when the en banc court repudiated a liberal
panel decision, it invariably did so by a lopsided margin. For instance,
in United States v. Kincade, Judge Reinhardt, joined by Judge Richard
A. Paez, held that the forced extraction of blood from parolees for DNA
analysis violates the Fourth Amendment. 119 The LEBC found no
constitutional violation, but the vote was 6 to 5, with no opinion
commanding a majority. 120
In half of the remaining cases, the LEBC, although not outright
rejecting the panel’s liberal holding, moved in a more conservative
direction. For example, in Robinson v. Solano County, the panel held
that the plaintiff raised a jury question as to whether officers’ use of
force was reasonable and that the officers were not protected by
qualified immunity. 121 The LEBC agreed that the plaintiff adequately

115

Lowry v. City of San Diego, 818 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2016).

Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Judge
Clifton, the panel dissenter, wrote the court opinion.
116
117

Comer v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2006).

118

Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

119

United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2003).

120

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

Robinson v. Solano County, 218 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000). The panel was
composed of two judges appointed by President Carter, Betty B. Fletcher and
William C. Canby.
121
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alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights but held that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 122
There were only five cases in which the LEBC, like the panel,
reached a liberal outcome. The evidence thus shows that in the realm of
constitutional criminal procedure, the en banc process has served, in
part, as a device though which the full court checks some of the most
extreme manifestations of liberal jurisprudence by Ninth Circuit
judges. That is not what would happen in a “reliably liberal” appellate
court. 123
2. Cases in which en banc rehearing was denied
I turn now to the failed en banc calls. There were 60 failed calls
targeting conservative panel decisions and 68 that targeted liberal
panel rulings. To put it another way, there were almost as many failed
calls from the liberal side of the court as there were from the
conservative side. 124
This near-equivalence will probably come as a surprise even to
those who follow the Ninth Circuit closely. That is so for three reasons.
First, almost half of the failed calls from the liberal side were not
memorialized in a published order. They were completely invisible to
the public, thus giving a misleading impression of the overall pattern of
en banc balloting. 125 Second, only 20 of the failed calls from the liberal
side generated published dissents, compared with 53 from the
conservative side. A published dissent, often with strong and colorful
language, draws attention in a way that a simple order does not. Third,
none of the cases was reviewed on the merits by the Supreme Court.126
122

Robinson v. Solano County,278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

123

See supra note 14 and accompanying text (quoting the New York Times).

I refer to calls from the liberal or conservative side rather than to calls from
liberal or conservative judges. At this stage in the inquiry, there is no need to rely on
characterizations of the ideology of the judges. And although most of the judges who
participated extensively in the en banc debates can easily be labeled as liberal or
conservative, there is one prominent exception, former judge Alex Kozinski.
124

Starting in 2018, the court has published all orders denying rehearing en
banc after a vote. But that was not the practice for almost the entirety of the study
period. See supra Part II.B.
125

Two panel decisions were GVR’d for reconsideration in light of an
intervening Supreme Court decision. In both cases, the panel on remand adhered to
126
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As will be seen, this record contrasts sharply with what happened in
the cases with dissents from the conservative side.
What were the cases in which, contrary to the stereotype, the
conservative position prevailed in the vote of the full Ninth Circuit?
The largest group was composed of habeas cases challenging imposition
of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. There were 15 such
cases, augmented by 6 in which the petitioner argued that the death
sentence was tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
the Sixth Amendment. Eleven cases raised Fourth Amendment issues,
and seven involved procedural questions under the federal habeas
corpus statute.
The published dissents from the denial of rehearing in these cases,
although relatively few in number, provide some of the best
information available about the issues that matter most to liberal
judges. And by highlighting the positions that failed to persuade a
majority of the court, they reveal the limits of the Ninth Circuit’s
liberalism. 127 For example:
• In United States v. Ziegler, the panel held that the defendant’s
employer validly consented to a search of the defendant’s office
and business computer. 128 Eleven judges dissented from the
denial of en banc rehearing. They joined in an opinion by Judge
William A. Fletcher saying that it was “preposterous to conclude
… that an employer's policy of remote electronic monitoring of
its employees' computer use” constituted “consent to law
its ruling rejecting the constitutional claim. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno,
617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (order denying rehearing en banc over dissent),
vacated, 565 U.S. 1189 (2013), on remand, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming
denial of suppression motion); Kleve v. Hill, 202 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (order
denying rehearing en banc over dissent), vacated, 531 U.S. 1108 (2001), on remand,
243 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying habeas corpus)..
In one case the panel reversed its pro-government decision after the denial of
rehearing en banc and also the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court. This was
because an intervening en banc ruling in another case had undercut the panel’s
rationale. See Poyson v. Ryan, 879 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (on panel rehearing); see
id. at 897 (Ikuta, J., concurring) (asserting that en banc decision was wrong but
recognizing that it was binding on the panel).
127

128

United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).
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enforcement to conduct a physical search for a computer in the
employee's locked private office.” 129
• In United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, the panel affirmed the
suppression of wrongfully obtained fingerprint exemplars but
held that the government could compel a new set of
exemplars. 130 Nine judges, in an opinion by Judge Richard A.
Paez, objected that the latter ruling “render[ed] the exclusionary
rule meaningless when applied to fingerprint evidence” and
would “promote disrespect for the law and disdain for the
judicial process.” 131
• In Sanchez v. County of San Diego, the panel rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a program of warrantless visits to the
homes of public assistance recipients. 132 Judge Pregerson, joined
by six other Democratic appointees, argued that “allowing [the
panel] opinion to stand is an assault on our country's poor as we
require them to give up their rights of privacy in exchange for
essential public assistance.” 133
• In Stokley v. Ryan, the panel allowed an execution to go
forward. 134 Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc
rehearing, with seven arguing in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt
that “[t]he panel's hastily-reached decision, without adequate

United States v. Ziegler, 497 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2007) (W. Fletcher, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing). All of the judges joining the dissent
were Democratic appointees except for Judge Kozinski.
129

130

United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 441 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (Paez,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). All of the judges were Democratic
appointees.
131

132

Sanchez v. County of San Diego,464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).

Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Kozinski dissented separately;
he did not join Judge Pregerson’s opinion. See id. at 969.
133

134

Stokley v Ryan, 705 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 2012).
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briefing … is simply inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
precedents ….” 135
• In Cooper v. Brown, another death penalty case, 11 judges
dissented from denial of en banc rehearing. 136 Judge W. Fletcher
opened his dissent with the words: “The State of California may
be about to execute an innocent man.” 137 His dissent extended
over more than 50 pages of the Federal Reporter. Judge
Reinhardt noted in his separate dissent that “the vote [was]
extremely close, closer than the list of dissenters would
suggest.” 138
Cases like these, along with the larger number without a
published dissent, show that arguments for liberal outcomes, even
when voiced by fellow judges, do not always carry the day in the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc balloting. Diehard liberals like Judge Pregerson and
Judge Reinhardt may have personified the Ninth Circuit in the public
mind, but their position on the ideological spectrum was not the court’s.
Failed en banc calls from the conservative side were only slightly
more numerous than those from the liberal side, but they had much
greater visibility and far greater prominence. Only 11 of the 68 cases
were not memorialized in a published order. And in all but 4 of the
other cases there was a published dissent from denial.
The most remarkable fact about these failed calls is that 27 of the
panel decisions – more than one-third of the total – were reviewed by
the Supreme Court, and all but three of those were reversed. 139 This
Stokley v Ryan, 704 F.3d 1010, 1012 9th Cir. 2012) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
135
136

Cooper v. Brown, 565 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2009).

137

Id. at 581 (W. Fletcher, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

Id. at 636 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The
Ninth Circuit was then a court of 27 active judges, so 14 votes would have been
required to grant en banc rehearing.
138

Even in the one case that I have counted as an exception, the Court rejected
much of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002).
Two additional decisions, consolidated for review, are pending at this writing after
the grant of certiorari. See Shinn v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2620 (2021), granting cert.
to 971 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2020) (denying rehearing en banc over dissent by eight
judges).
139
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tally includes nine decisions that were reversed summarily on the
certiorari papers. Six other cases were GVR’d by the Supreme Court.
Four resulted in an about-face by the panel after the remand. 140 In the
two cases where the panel adhered to its position after the GVR, the
Supreme Court later reversed – in one instance, summarily. 141 Another
case was overruled by the Supreme Court when the state challenged it
in a later certiorari petition. 142 This record contrasts sharply with that
of the failed calls from the liberal side; as already noted, the Supreme
Court reviewed none of those cases.
All but five of the Supreme Court reversals came in cases in which
the order denying rehearing en banc was accompanied by a dissenting
opinion. That is not a coincidence. Conservative judges on the Ninth
Circuit are well aware that the Supreme Court pays attention to their
dissents from denial of rehearing. A decade ago, Judge Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, the leader of the Ninth Circuit’s conservative cohort,

See Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (on remand from
Supreme Court, rejecting habeas challenge to admission of confessions); Schad v.
Ryan, 671 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2011) (on remand from Supreme Court, affirming
denial of habeas relief in capital case); United States v. Gonzalez, 450 Fed. Appx.
662 (9th Cir. 2011) (on remand from Supreme Court, affirming denial of Fourth
Amendment suppression motion); Rodis v. City & Cty of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964
(9th Cir. 2009) (on remand from Supreme Court, reversing denial of qualified
immunity). In one additional case, the panel changed course after the Supreme
Court reversed a panel decision not involving an en banc vote. See Gaston v. Palmer,
447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of habeas petition as timebarred); compare Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
140

The account in the text greatly simplifies the long and tortured history that
preceded the summary reversal. See Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 9 (2011) (per
curiam) (stating that after each of two GVRs, “the panel persisted in its course,
reinstating its judgment without seriously confronting the significance of the cases
called to its attention.”). For the dissent from denial of en banc rehearing, see Smith
v. Mitchell, 453 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2006).
141

The other GVR case also had a long and tortured history, with the reversal
coming after a separate dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. See Ayers v.
Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 10-11 (2007) (summarizing habeas history).
See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S.216 (2011) (per curiam); compare Pearson
v. Muntz, 625 F.3d 539 541 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting from denial of en
banc rehearing). The state did not file a certiorari petition in Pearson.
142
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described these “dissentals” 143 as an internal mechanism “which can
alert the Justices to Ninth Circuit error and act as a stabilizing force
for the rule of law.” 144 Analyzing the statistics, he explained why he
was “inclined to believe that efforts within the Ninth Circuit to dissent
from ill-founded denials of rehearing en banc are not for naught.” He
urged his colleagues to expand “the community of dissental writing on
the Ninth Circuit” and to “coordinat[e] dissental authorship to
maximize their necessitated output.”
We do not know if Ninth Circuit judges have coordinated their
dissents, but they have continued to write them, and many have been
vindicated by the Supreme Court. In the 2020 Term alone, the Court
reversed seven panel decisions that drew dissents from denial of en ban
rehearing. One of these involved constitutional criminal procedure. 145
Two types of cases feature prominently in the dissents from the
conservative side – and also in the Supreme Court reversals. First,
there are habeas cases in which the panel granted relief to a state
prisoner notwithstanding the strictures of AEDPA. For example, in a
2019 habeas case, twelve judges joined a dissent by Judge Carlos Bea
accusing the panel majority of “re-writing AEDPA entirely to institute
the federal habeas court as a mere second state appellate court of state
law error review.” 146 The Supreme Court summarily reversed, saying
that the panel “exceeded its authority in rejecting [the state court’s]
determination, which was not so obviously wrong as to be ‘beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” 147 Second, there are § 1983
cases in which the panel denied qualified immunity to defendants
acting under color state law. In one such proceeding, Judge Sandra S.
Ikuta began her dissent by saying, “The panel opinion that we let stand

See Alex Kozinski, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121 Yale L.J. Online
601 (2012). I do not like this coinage, but it can be a handy shorthand.
143
144

O’Scannlain, supra note 21, at 2177.

See Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517 (2020), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 146-147.
145

Kayer v. Ryan, 944 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019) (Bea, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (punctuation altered).
146

Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 526 (2020) (per curiam). Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented without opinion.
147
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today directly contravenes the Supreme Court's repeated directive not
to frame clearly established law in excessive force cases at too high a
level of generality.” 148 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed
summarily. 149
3. Conclusion
Dissents like those I have just quoted, and the Supreme Court
reversals that often follow, receive extensive attention in legal media
and widely read blogs. 150 This coverage reinforces the perception that
the Ninth Circuit is an out-of-control liberal court that routinely flouts
Supreme Court precedents, particularly those that limit the authority
of federal courts to intervene in state criminal justice processes. There
is some validity to that perception, but the findings summarized in the
preceding pages tell us that the overall picture is more nuanced. Some
liberal panel decisions are rejected by the Ninth Circuit itself when the
full court votes on rehearing en banc. And some conservative panel
decisions remain good law when the en banc call fails.
In the realm of constitutional criminal procedure, then, the Ninth
Circuit emerges as a predominantly liberal court – but also a court in
which the most liberal judges do not always prevail. The next step is to
determine whether that is also true of other areas in which an
ideological divide can be clearly identified.
Before pursuing that inquiry, one other point deserves mention.
The dissents from denial of rehearing on issues of constitutional
criminal procedure confirm the strong correlation between ideology and
the party of the appointing President. The dissents from the liberal side
were overwhelmingly written and joined by appointees of Democratic
Presidents Carter, Clinton, and Obama. Only two Republican
appointees wrote or joined any of those dissents: Judge Alex Kozinski
and Judge Andrew Kleinfeld. The dissents from the conservative side
Hughes v. Kisela, 862 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 2016) (Ikuta, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
148

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam). Justice Sotomayor,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.
149

See, e.g., Karp, supra note 17; Ed Whelan, Congrats, Judge Ikuta!, Bench
Memos, July 1, 2021, https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/congrats-judgeikuta/.
150
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were overwhelmingly written and joined by appointees of Republican
Presidents. The most prominent exception was Judge Richard Tallman,
who as noted earlier was appointed by President Clinton as part of a
deal with a Republican Senator. 151 Judge Tallman joined all but a
handful of the dissents from the conservative side. Judge Ronald Gould,
another Clinton appointee, joined roughly one out of three. Two other
Clinton appointees, Judges Margaret McKeown and Susan Graber,
joined on rare occasions, as did Judge John Owens, appointed by
President Obama. But with those few exceptions, ideology and political
affiliation coincided.
By the same token, the constitutional criminal procedure cases
enable us to provisionally identify liberal and conservative blocs among
the judges on the Ninth Circuit. The liberal bloc includes Judges
Pregerson, Reinhardt, Thomas, W. Fletcher, 152 Paez, and Berzon. 153 The
conservative bloc includes Judges O’Scannlain, Tallman, Callahan,
Bea, and Ikuta.
B. Immigration Appeals
Immigration cases occupy a special position for the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. “Historically, the Ninth Circuit has usually received
about half of the immigration cases filed in the country.” 154 In the early
years of the twenty-first century, immigration appeals comprised a
remarkable 45% of the Ninth Circuit’s docket. 155 Today the proportion
is almost one-third. 156
In his profile of “liberal judges,” Judge Reinhardt explained how
judicial ideology plays out in immigration cases. Liberal judges, he said,
151

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

Ninth Circuit opinions continue to refer to Judge “W. Fletcher,” and I will
follow the same practice.
152
153

Here and elsewhere, judges are listed in the order of seniority.

Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing, 48 Ariz.
L. Rev. 287, 297 (2006).
154
155

Id.

United States Courts, Ninth Circuit Annual Report 2020 at 60,
AnnualReport2020.pdf (uscourts.gov). The figure in the Report includes “other
agency matters,” but these are relatively few in number.
156
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“are frequently a fairly soft touch [for aliens seeking asylum], while
conservatives are more likely to defer to the often harsh, mechanical
rulings of the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 157 This description
accords with the manner in which political scientists have analyzed
immigration cases generally for more than half a century: a vote in
favor of the alien is characterized as liberal, while a vote in favor of the
government is deemed conservative. 158
The ideological divide in the Ninth Circuit on immigration cases is
deep-seated and longstanding. As Judge Reinhardt’s comment
suggests, the divide is reflected most prominently in disagreement over
the role of courts in reviewing administrative determinations regarding
asylum, removal, and other proceedings under the immigration laws.
Some years ago, in a series of interviews with the late Professor
Stephen L. Wasby, members of the court cast a revealing light on the
nature and origin of this disagreement. 159 According to these
interviews, some judges, “out of exasperation or conviction,” have come
to accept the perception of the judiciary as having “a transcendent role
as between the three branches of government.” Others, while perhaps
acknowledging that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) is not a paragon among
agencies, insist that it is not the judicial role to reverse every
miscarriage of justice. “Fundamental [differences] as to the rationality
and fairness [of the] immigration laws;” different visions of heaven; the
“dogmatic” versus the “humane” approach to the language of the
statute: these were among the thoughts voiced by the judges to explain
the variations in outcomes in the court's decisions.

157

Reinhardt, supra note 78, at 48.

See, e.g,, S. Sidney Ulmer, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some
Practical and Theoretical Applications, 28 Law & Contemp. Problems 164, 167
(1963).
158

These interviews were conducted by Professor Wasby, of the Department of
Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany, in the spring and
early summer of 1986. Only the responses, not the names of the judges, were
provided to me. I am grateful to Professor Wasby for permission to use this material.
The comments were previously published in Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc:
The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 21 Ariz. St. L. J. 915, 973-74
(1991).
159
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In the course of the study period, immigration cases generated 100
en banc calls directed to panel decisions. 160 (See Table 2.) Sixty-one of
these targeted rulings that were conservative, i.e. adverse to the alien;
the other 39 targeted decisions favoring the alien. Of the 61 calls
challenging a conservative panel decision, 33 were successful, for a
grant rate of 54% – exactly the same percentage as for issues of
constitutional criminal procedure. Of the 39 calls targeting liberal
panel decisions, only 15 were successful, for a grant rate of 38%. That is
slightly higher than the grant rate of 34% in the constitutional criminal
procedure realm, but substantially lower than the grant rate for
conservative panel decisions.
Table 2
En Banc Ballots: Immigration Cases
Total

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

Conservative Panel Decision

61

33

28

54%

Liberal Panel Decision

39

15

24

38%

Total

100

48

52

48%

There was thus a total of 48 immigration cases in which en banc
rehearing was granted. All but 15 were cases in which the panel had
ruled in favor of the government. And in 23 of the 33 cases the panel’s
ruling in favor of the government was replaced by an LEBC decision
favoring the alien. For example, in Borja v. INS, the panel opinion by
Judge O’Scannlain rejected an alien’s claim for asylum; the LEBC
found that the claim was meritorious. 161 In Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales,
the panel held that an alien’s state criminal conviction involved a crime
of moral turpitude, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal;
the LEBC found that the conviction was not disqualifying. 162 Two
The vast majority of these cases involved application or interpretation of
immigration statutes and regulations, but there were a few in which the court
considered whether to grant relief on constitutional grounds.
160

See Borja v. INS, 139 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 1998), on rehearing en banc, 175
F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 1999).
161

See Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales. 455 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006), on rehearing
en banc, 503 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007).
162
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additional LEBC
holding. 163

decisions

tempered

the

panel’s

conservative

No such clear-cut pattern is found in the 15 cases where the en
banc call was directed to a liberal panel opinion. 164 What stands out,
though, as that as with the constitutional criminal procedure cases, the
en banc process sometimes functioned as a device through which the
full court could check perceived excesses of liberal jurisprudence. For
example, in Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, Judge Reinhardt, joined by a
visiting judge, held that Congress acted unconstitutionally when it
excluded from eligibility for cancellation of removal anyone who has
been a “habitual drunkard” during the relevant period. 165 The LEBC
rejected that holding by a vote of 9 to 2, with the dissenters arguing
only for a remand based on statutory interpretation. 166 There were only
three cases in which the LEBC, like the panel, reached a liberal result.
This brings us to the 52 immigration cases in which the en banc
call failed. In contrast to the criminal constitutional realm,
conservative panel decisions that were allowed to stand slightly
outnumbered the liberal rulings – 28 for the former, 24 for the latter.
And there were almost as many dissentals from the liberal side as from
the conservative side – 11 versus 12. For example, in one case involving
removal based on a prior felony conviction, 12 judges dissented from
the denial of rehearing of a panel decision that Judge Reinhardt
described as “not only contrary to well-established precedent but …

See Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir.2014) (en banc) (remanding for
BIA to consider whether alien’s conviction categorically constituted crime of moral
turpitude); Andrieu v. Reno, 253 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (denying relief to
alien but rejecting Government’s interpretation of statute).
163

In three of the 15 cases the LEBC dismissed without reaching the merits. In
one case the LEBC suspended proceedings to await a Supreme Court decision; the
Supreme Court then resolved the issue in accordance with the panel’s ruling. See
Lopez v. Garland, 998 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citing Niz-Chavez v.
Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021)).
164

Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2016). Judge Richard
Clifton dissented. (The alien also sought voluntary departure.)
165
166

Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
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manifestly unjust.” 167 And five judges protested a panel ruling that in
their view “shut the courthouse doors” on alien children seeking
counsel in removal proceedings. 168
To be sure, there was also strong language in dissentals from the
conservative side. Nine judges joined an opinion that accused the panel
majority of “a feat of interpretive creativity” that “transgressed the
clear limits of our constitutional jurisdiction.” 169 In another case, ten
judges joined a dissent arguing that “the panel's artful evasion of the
REAL ID Act is nothing short of an outright arrogation of the agency's
statutory duty as trier of fact. 170
In the latter case, the Supreme Court reversed the panel
decision. 171 But that was the only instance in which the Court reversed
a liberal panel decision that was the subject of a failed en banc call.
Two other cases were GVR’d for reconsideration in light of an
intervening decision. 172 And one liberal ruling was essentially
affirmed. 173
It may seem surprising that cert petitions were filed in only four of
the 24 cases in which the liberal panel decision was allowed to stand.
Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see id. at 811 (Tashima, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
167

J. E. F.M. v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
168

Ramadan v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 973, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (O’’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
169

Ming Dai v. Barr, 940 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2019) (Callahan, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
170
171

Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669 (2021).

See Penuliar v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying rehearing en
banc), vacated, 549 U.S. 1078 (2007); Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1222 (9th
Cir.2005) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), vacated, 549
U.S. 801 (2006). In Penuliar, the panel on remand adhered to its decision in favor of
the alien. See Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2008). In Tchoukhrova
the docket shows that the parties settled.
172

See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Zavydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2002) (agreeing with Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of statute).
The order denying rehearing en banc after a vote can be found in the certiorari
petition.
173
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The losing party was the United States Government, and the Solicitor
General has a very high success rate for the petitions he or she files.174
It is a possible inference that the SG decided that the cases were just
not important enough to seek further review. Indeed, in at least two
cases the SG asked for, and received, additional time in which to file a
cert petition – but no petition was filed. 175
The immigration cases thus reinforce the conclusion suggested by
the constitutional criminal procedure cases: the Ninth Circuit is a
predominantly liberal court, but it is not a reliably liberal court. In
some important cases the most liberal judges were on the losing side.
That group includes one of the rare instances in which judges sought
rehearing by the full court after the LEBC decision. 176 And in some of
the cases in which the liberals prevailed, the stakes may not have been
high.
Finally, there is another similarity between the immigration cases
and the constitutional criminal procedure cases: ideology correlates
closely with the political party of the appointing President. Dissents
from denial of rehearing from the liberal side were overwhelmingly
written and joined by appointees of Democratic Presidents; dissents
from the conservative side almost invariably come from Republican
appointees.
C. Labor and Employment Law
In studies of judicial ideology, labor and employment law occupies
a prominent place, in large part because there is universal agreement
See Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1609,
1631 (2017) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court grants a whopping 70 percent of the
Solicitor General’s certiorari requests – as opposed to 5 percent generally, and 21
percent for the specialty Supreme Court bar”).
174

See Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bea, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Ramadan v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 973 (9th
Cir. 2007) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The
applications for extension of time can be found on the Supreme Court’s public
docket.
175

See Abebe v. Holder, 577 F.3d 1113, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting from denial of full-court rehearing) (“If ever a case merited full court en
banc consideration, this one did.”). Six judges joined the dissent – Judges Pregerson,
Reinhardt, Thomas, Kim A. Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, and Paez.
176
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on how decisions and votes are to be characterized: a decision or vote in
favor of an employee or a union is classified as liberal, while a decision
or vote in favor of an employer is classified as conservative. 177 Although
workplace cases do not loom large in the Ninth Circuit’s en banc
activity, they thus warrant separate consideration here. 178
During the period of the study there were 43 en banc calls
targeting panel decisions in workplace disputes – 25 from the liberal
side, 16 from the conservative side, and two calls (one successful, one
not) that resist ideological classification. 179 (See Table 3.) Of the 25 calls
from the liberal side, 19 resulted in en banc rehearing – a success rate
of 76%, far higher than the counterpart rate for constitutional criminal
procedure or immigration cases. Of the 16 calls from the conservative
side, 5 were successful, for a grant rate of 31%, slightly lower than in
the other two areas of law.
Table 3
En Banc Ballots: Labor and Employment Law
Total

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

Conservative Panel Decision

25

19

6

76%

Liberal Panel Decision

16

5

11

31%

Other Panel Decision

2

1

1

50%

Total

43

25

18

58%

Two things stand out about the successful en banc calls. First, in
14 of the 19 cases in which a conservative panel decision was reheard
en banc, the outcome changed; the employee or the union prevailed in

See, e.g., Brian S. Clarke, ObamaCourts?: The Impact of Judicial
Nominations on Court Ideology, 30 J. L. & Pol. 191, 202-03 (2014)
177

Workplace litigation is a subset of what a pioneering scholar of judicial
ideology referred to as “economic liberalism.” For discussion of other economic
liberalism cases, see infra Part IV.H.
178

See Price v. Stevedoring Services of Am., 697 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (overruling precedents extending Chevron deference to litigating positions of
Director of Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs); Staton v. Boeing Co,, 327
F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting settlement agreement in employment
discrimination class action lawsuit).
179
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the LEBC. 180 Second, in none of the five cases in which a liberal
decision was reheard did the employee suffer an unequivocal defeat. In
four of the five cases, the LEBC ruling, although less favorable to the
employee than the panel decision, nevertheless allowed the claim to go
forward. 181
The fifth case, involving a high-profile Title VII suit, is of
particular interest. In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., a divided panel
approved what the Supreme Court later called “one of the most
expansive class actions ever.” 182 The full court voted to take the case en
banc, very likely because a majority of the judges agreed with the panel
dissent that the class certification was seriously flawed and should
never have been allowed. 183 But thanks to the luck of the draw, the
LEBC, by vote of 6 to 5, essentially ratified the panel’s decision. 184
In workplace litigation we thus find an area of law in which the
pattern of en banc voting conforms closely to what one would expect of
a reliably liberal court. When an en banc call targets a panel ruling
rejecting claims by an employee or a union, the call generally succeeds,
and the outcome is generally reversed. When the panel ruling favors
the employee or union, the ruling generally stands, perhaps with some
tempering if en banc rehearing is granted.
A similar pattern can be seen in the handful of cases – five in all –
in which the question was whether federal labor law preempted claims
under state law. There were four cases in which employers or their
See, e.g., Marsh v. J. Alexander’s LLC, 869 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017) (Ikuta,
J.), on rehearing en banc, 905 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2018) (tip credit under Fair Labor
Standards Act); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 238 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2001), on
rehearing en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (mixed-motive instruction in Title
VII case).
180

E.g., Bates v. UPS, Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (suit by
hearing-impaired drivers under Americans with Disabilities Act).
181

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011); see Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
182

See 509 F.3d at 1200 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“This class certification
violates the requirements of Rule 23. It sacrifices the rights of women injured by sex
discrimination. And it violates Wal–Mart's constitutional rights.”),
183

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d,
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
184
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representatives argued for preemption. In three of them, the panel
accepted the argument. In all three, the court granted en banc
rehearing; the LEBC then reversed the panel outcome and ruled in
favor of the employee or union position. 185 In the fourth case, the panel
rejected the employer position, and rehearing en banc was denied. 186
Eight judges (seven Republican appointees and Judge Tallman) joined
the dissental. 187
The fifth case was the only one in which the liberal position did
not prevail. An insurer sued an employee for reimbursement of benefits
paid to the employee under a health insurance plan selected by his
employer. The employee argued that the claim was preempted by
ERISA, but the panel found no preemption. 188 The en banc call failed,
with six judges (all Democratic appointees) joining a dissental. 189
One final note. Although there were not many dissents from denial
of rehearing en banc in the workplace cases, those that were filed
reflect alignments similar to those in the constitutional criminal
procedure and immigration cases. Dissents from the liberal side were
joined exclusively by Democratic appointees. Dissents from the
conservative side were joined overwhelmingly by Republican
appointees.

See Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 846 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2017), on
rehearing en banc, 898 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2018) (state family leave law and Railway
Labor Act); Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 422 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2005), on
rehearing en banc, 463 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (state limit on employer speech and
National Labor Relations Act); Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122
(9th Cir. 2000), on rehearing en banc, 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (invasion of
privacy by employer and Labor Management Relations Act).
185

Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City & Cty of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000
(9th Cir. 2009).
186

Id. at 1004 (M. Smith., J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(arguing that city ordinance upheld by panel “flouts the mandate of national
uniformity in the area of employer-provided healthcare that underlies the enactment
of ERISA”).
187

188

Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 361 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2004).

Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d (9th Cir. 2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
189
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D. Federal Criminal Law and Procedure
Another major component of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc balloting
docket encompasses issues of criminal law and procedure not directly
implicating rights under the Constitution. The cases involve such
questions as the elements of, and defenses to, federal crimes; the
application of sentencing statutes and Guidelines; and the procedural
rights of criminal defendants under federal statutes and Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
The traditional ideological alignment reflected in the
constitutional-criminal cases generally applies here as well: a vote for
the defendant is a liberal vote, and a vote for the government is a
conservative vote. That is one of the “conventional understandings” of
the ideological divide, 190 and this particular aspect is reinforced by a
study of Supreme Court voting patterns published by Professor Ward
Farnsworth at the end of the Rehnquist Court. 191 Professor Farnsworth
separately tallied the Justices’ votes in constitutional and nonconstitutional criminal cases. 192 He found that the Justices of that era
could be divided into two groups – five “hawks” (conservatives) and four
“doves” (liberals) – and that there was “a large drop-off between the
last of the [hawks] and the first of the [doves].” 193 The “hawks” voted for
the government in more than 70% of the non-unanimous cases,
whether constitutional or non-constitutional; none of the four “doves”
went above 50%. 194
There is one difference between the constitutional and the nonconstitutional cases, however: in the latter, the choice of rule is
sometimes neutral as between the defendant and the government. In

190

See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court's
Criminal Docket, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 67 (2005).
191

Professor Farnsworth’s classification differed from mine in one respect: he
classified cases on the availability of habeas corpus for state prisoners as statutory
cases. That does not affect the point discussed here.
192

193

Farnsworth, supra note 191, at 74-75.

194

Id. at 69 & Chart 1.
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this study, three cases – all reheard en banc – were excluded from the
analysis on that basis. 195
With those cases put to one side, the number of en banc calls
directed to panel decisions was 86. The calls were almost evenly split
between conservative and liberal panel decisions – 44 from the former,
42 from the latter. (See Table 4.) And in sharp contrast to the criminal
justice cases involving constitutional claims, the grant rates for the two
groups were not far apart: 26 of 44 or 59% from conservative decisions
and 22 of 42 or 52% from liberal decisions.
Table 4
En Banc Ballots: Federal Criminal Law and Procedure
Total

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

Conservative Panel Decision

44

26

18

59%

Liberal Panel Decision

42

22

20

52%

Other Panel Decision

3

3

0

100%

Total

89

51

38

57%

A review of the cases in the latter group does not reveal any
patterns that explain why the proportion is so high relative to the
counterpart constitutional sphere. One possibility is that in the realm
of criminal justice in the Ninth Circuit the non-constitutional cases
simply do not implicate the ideological divide to the same degree as the
constitutional cases do. To test this hypothesis, we can look at the cases
in which judges dissented from the denial of en banc rehearing.
Although the number of failed calls from the liberal side almost
equaled the number from the conservative side (18 for the former, 20
for the latter), dissenting opinions on the conservative side were far
more numerous – 15 compared to six. And for the most part the judges
See United States v. Bacon, 979 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(overruling circuit precedent on remedy on appeal for district court error in
admitting or excluding expert testimony); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (rejecting appellate presumption of reasonableness for sentences
imposed within the Guidelines range); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (delineating permissible role for magistrate judges in
conducting plea colloquies under Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
195
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who wrote or joined the dissentals were the same judges who wrote or
joined dissentals on constitutional criminal procedure, and on the same
side. It thus appears that, as in the Supreme Court, 196 a hawk is a
hawk whether the issue is constitutional or statutory, and so with the
doves.
There is another piece of evidence that may be relevant here. This
study focuses on en banc calls that target decisions by three-judge
panels. But in this segment of the docket there was a disproportionate
number of cases in which the court granted en banc rehearing at the
behest of a panel before a decision was issued – ten, compared with four
on constitutional criminal procedure issues. 197 This may suggest that
on statutory issues affecting the treatment of criminal defendants, the
judges place a particularly high value on uniformity within the circuit
and may sometimes vote to grant en banc rehearing of panel decisions
even if they do not think the panel “got it wrong.” But whatever the
explanation, the conclusion cannot be gainsaid: if one were to look at
this segment of the docket alone, the perception of the Ninth Circuit as
a reliably liberal court would find little support.
E. Other Civil Liberties Claims: Traditional Polarity
In the domain of civil liberties, criminal procedure is by far the
largest area in which the traditional ideological alignment continues to
hold sway, but it is certainly not the only one. On equal protection
issues, for example (except for challenges to affirmative action
programs), a decision supporting the constitutional claim is a liberal
decision. 198 So too with claims under the Establishment Clause, claims
grounded in substantive due process, and claims by prisoners and
detainees under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process clauses.
So too with claims under federal statutes designed to implement
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights – statutes like the Voting
Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act.

196

See supra note 194 and accompanying text.

Recall that there were 234 en banc calls challenging panel decisions on
constitutional criminal procedure issues, compared with 89 in this group.
197
198

For discussion of affirmative action cases, see infra Part IV.G.
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During the period of the study, 70 panel decisions involving issues
of this kind were the subject of en banc ballots. (See Table 5.) These
included 29 in which the panel reached a conservative result and 41 in
which the result was liberal. 199 Of the 29 calls generated by a
conservative decision, 18 were successful, for a grant rate of 62%. Of
the 41 calls prompted by a liberal decision, only 11 succeeded, for a
grant rate of 27%. 200 Thus, in this sector of the docket the grant rate for
conservative decisions was somewhat higher than in the constitutional
criminal procedure cases; the grant rate for liberal decisions was
somewhat lower. At the same time, we do not see the strong preference
for liberal outcomes manifested in the realm of labor and employment
law.
Table 5
En Banc Ballots: Other Civil Liberties Claims: Traditional Polarity
Total

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

Conservative Panel Decision

29

18

11

62%

Liberal Panel Decision

41

11

30

27%

Total

70

29

41

41%

The cases ranged widely in the realm of civil liberties, but one
issue that looms large in national discussions of judicial ideology barely
registered in the Ninth Circuit’s en banc debates – the issue of
abortion. There were only two en banc calls directed to panel decisions
that considered the constitutionality of state or federal abortion laws.
Both cases arose early in the study period, and both involved Arizona
199

The latter included one reverse polarity case. See infra note 200.

The liberal decisions that were reheard en banc included one case in which
the panel rejected a claim under the Establishment Clause. This was Catholic
League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City & County of San Francisco, 567 F.3d
595 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs, who were “Catholics and a Catholic advocacy group,”
challenged “an official [city] resolution denouncing their church and doctrines of
their religion.” See Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City & County
of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). On rehearing en
banc, the only support for the constitutional claim came from conservative judges.
See id. at 1046, 1053-60 (opinion of Kleinfeld, J.). I therefore classified the case as
one reflecting reverse polarity.
200
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statutes regulating access to abortion by minors. Both calls failed. In
the first case, the panel held the statute unconstitutional. 201 Judge
O’Scannlain, dissenting from the denial of rehearing, accused the panel
of committing “a lawless assault on a legitimate exercise in democratic
government.” 202 Only two other judges joined his opinion. Arizona then
enacted a new statute, and a divided panel rejected a facial challenge to
its validity. 203 A judge called for en banc rehearing, but rehearing was
denied without a published dissent or notation. 204
In the years that followed, three-judge panels decided seven other
cases involving challenges to abortion regulations. Every one of them
ruled unanimously in favor of the constitutional claim. 205 None of the
decisions generated an en banc call.
It may seem anomalous that members of the conservative cohort,
who frequently challenged liberal panel decisions sustaining other
constitutional claims, acquiesced when panels struck down laws
regulating abortion. But in two cases that might otherwise have
prompted an en banc call, the losing government officials did not seek
rehearing in the Ninth Circuit but rather went directly to the Supreme
Court. 206 Indeed, after 2004, there was not a single government PFREB
in an abortion case. That might seem even more anomalous, but a
201

Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 180 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1999).

Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 193 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge O’Scannlain
argued that the case was controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990). Id. at 1044-45.
202

203

Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2002).

204

See 2003 case list (on file with author).

Most of the decisions ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the law. E.g., Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v.
Humble, 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014). One reversed a district court decision
granting summary judgment to the state. Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d
531 (9th Cir. 2004).
205

See Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding federal Partial Birth Abortion Act unconstitutional), rev’d sub
nom. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc., v.
Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging disagreement with other
circuits over proper approach to “undue burden” test), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1060
(2004).
206
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possible clue can be found in an opinion by Judge Kleinfeld concurring
in a decision that invalidated an Arizona law that “prohibit[ed]
abortion beginning at twenty weeks gestation, before the fetus is
viable.” 207 Judge Kleinfeld had joined Judge O’Scannlain’s dissental in
the Arizona case on minors’ access to abortion, and here he thought
that the state had good arguments in support of the statute. 208 But
those arguments could not carry the day, because the Supreme Court
had “spoke[n] clearly … as to the current state of the law,” particularly
with respect to the “undue burden” test. 209 State officials and other
Ninth Circuit judges may have similarly believed that Supreme Court
precedents left little room for lower courts to uphold the challenged
state abortion laws. 210
As for the cases that did generate en banc activity, two patterns
deserve mention. One involves cases in which the en banc call was
successful; the other, cases in which the call failed.
First, once again we see the full court using the en banc process to
rein in perceived excesses of liberal jurisprudence. Here are some
examples.
• A panel composed of Judges Pregerson, Thomas, and Paez
invoked the Equal Protection Clause to require California to
delay an impending election on recalling Governor Gray
Davis. 211 Within days, the full court voted to rehear the case en

207

Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013).

208

See id. at 1231-32 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).

Id. at 1233-34. The case in which Judge O’Scannlain wrote the dissental did
not involve the undue burden test but rather a distinct line of precedents on judicial
bypass provisions.
209

The Fifth Circuit read the Supreme Court precedents differently. See, e.g.,
Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, 780 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting
balancing test used by Ninth Circuit). Initially, a divided Supreme Court agreed
with the Ninth Circuit, see Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 60708 (2016) (rejecting Fifth Circuit’s approach), but in a later decision five Justices
repudiated that position, see June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2182
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (summarizing opinions).
210

211

2003).

Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.
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banc, and the LEBC unanimously allowed the election to go
forward as scheduled. 212
• A divided panel, in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt, held that
delays in providing mental health care to veterans violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 213 After the court
granted rehearing en banc, the LEBC rejected the veterans’
constitutional claims by a vote of 10 to 1. 214
• A visiting judge, joined by Judge Reinhardt, held that “the right
to procreate survives incarceration,” and that a prisoner could
proceed with his substantive due process claim of a right to mail
his semen from prison so that his wife could be artificially
inseminated. 215 Rehearing en banc was granted, and the en banc
court, by a vote of 6 to 5, rejected the claim, stating
unequivocally that “the right to procreate is fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration.” 216
To be sure, cases like these were a minority of the en banc grants in
these areas of the law. A larger number conformed to the expected
pattern: a conservative panel decision was replaced by a liberal en banc
ruling. 217 But both sets of cases must be considered in assessing where
the Ninth Circuit stands on the ideological spectrum.
Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc). None of the panel judges was selected for the en banc court. Nor
were Judges W. Fletcher or Berzon. Judge Reinhardt was recused.
212

When the composition of the LEBC was announced, Judge Pregerson correctly
predicted that his decision would be repudiated. He told a reporter, “You know who’s
on the [en banc] panel, right? Do you think it’s going to have much of a chance of
surviving? I wouldn’t bet on it.” See Henry Weinstein, Court to Reconsider Delay of
Recall Vote, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 2003.
213

Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).

Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc). Judge Mary M. Schroeder dissented from one of the LEBC’s jurisdictional
holdings. See id. at 1037 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
214

Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2001). Judge Barry
Silverman, a Clinton appointee, dissented.
215
216

Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 904 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2018), on
rehearing en banc, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’d sub nom. Brnovich v. DNC,
217
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Second, dissentals from the conservative side generally did not
lead to Supreme Court review and reversal. There were dissents from
denial of rehearing in 27 of the 30 cases in which the unsuccessful en
banc call challenged a liberal panel decision. Certiorari petitions were
filed in 20 of the 27 cases, but only seven were granted. The Supreme
Court reversed six panel decisions; however, in three of them the
reversal was on procedural grounds, not the ground argued by the
dissental. 218 Two additional cases were GVR’d. In one, the panel
retreated from one portion of its ruling; 219 in the other, the panel
reversed course entirely. 220
Meanwhile, the Court denied review in other cases with liberal
outcomes notwithstanding dissentals that attacked the panel decisions
in near-apocalyptic terms. For example:

141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (Voting Rights Act); Lopez-Valenzuela v. City of Maricopa,
719 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2013), on rehearing en banc, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014)
(substantive due process rights of illegal aliens).
Compare Perry v. Brown, 681 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2012) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (attacking panel’s decision holding
California’s Proposition 8 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause), with
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (holding that panel lacked jurisdiction
to consider appeal); compare Winn v. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 586 F.3d
649, 658 (9th Cir. 2009) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (disputing panel’s holding that educational tax credit program violated
Establishment Clause), with Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S.
125 (2011) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge program); compare
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 2003) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (rejecting panel’s conclusion that
voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public school violates the
Establishment Clause), with Elk Grove Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (reversing panel on ground that plaintiff lacked prudential standing).
218

See Conn v. City of Reno, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011). The panel reinstated
the sections of its opinion finding a constitutional violation and denying qualified
immunity – rulings that were harshly criticized by the dissental. See Conn v. City of
Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). The panel repudiated only the portions allowing the claim of
municipal liability to go forward.
219

See Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2009); compare Phillips v. Hust,
507 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
220
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• “This is a dark day for the Voting Rights Act. … The panel …
misinterprets the evidence, flouts our voting rights precedent
and tramples settled circuit law pertaining to summary
judgment, all in an effort to give felons the right to vote.” 221
• “The panel's opinion in these consolidated cases invents an
entirely unprecedented theory of actionable government
discrimination: sinister intent in the enactment of facially
neutral legislation can generate civil liability without evidence
of discriminatory effect.” 222
• The panel’s holding “has begun wreaking havoc on local
governments, residents, and businesses throughout our circuit,”
and its opinion “shackles the hands of public officials trying to
redress the serious societal concern of homelessness.” 223
Attacks like these reinforce the perception of the Ninth Circuit as an
out-of-the-mainstream liberal court that recklessly expands individual
rights without regard to precedent or consequences. But the denials of
certiorari, while not to be taken as expressions of approval, suggest
that the Supreme Court did not share the dissenters’ view of the import
of the panel decisions. And when we consider also the cases in which
Ninth Circuit judges used the en banc process to dislodge liberal panel
opinions, the overall picture that emerges is of a court that is
predominantly, perhaps even strongly, liberal – but also one in which
the conservative side is not shut out.
F. Freedom of Expression
In the Warren Court era and for decades thereafter, the ideological
valence of freedom of expression closely tracked that of constitutional

Farrakhan v. State of Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1116 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 934 (2004).
221

Pacific Shore Properties, LLC, v. City of Newport Beach, 746 F.3d 936 (9th
Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied,
574 U.S. 974 (2014).
222

Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019) (M. Smith, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019).
223
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criminal procedure. 224 A decision or vote in favor of the constitutional
claim was liberal; a decision or vote against the claim was conservative.
As late as 1997, Judge Reinhardt, in defining the credo of a liberal
judge, stated unequivocally that “[l]iberal judges believe in a generous
or expansive interpretation of the Bill of Rights,” and he specified
“freedom of speech,” without qualification, as one of the rights to be
given an expansive interpretation. 225
Today, classification is much more difficult. Increasingly, and in a
variety of contexts, protection of free speech is regarded as the
conservative, not the liberal, position. 226 This shift has come about
primarily because the Supreme Court, over the last quarter-century,
has handed down an array of decisions in which the constitutional
claim has received more support from conservative Justices than from
the liberals. 227 In an article published in 2020, I used the term “reverse
polarity” to characterize this phenomenon. 228 Based on an analysis of
the Court’s decisions, I identified four areas of First Amendment law
that reflect reverse polarity currently and two others that might do so
in the future. 229

On the latter, see supra Part IV.A. In this Article, I shall refer
interchangeably to “freedom of expression” and “freedom of speech.” Both terms
encompass the First Amendment’s’ guarantees of “the freedom of speech, [and] of the
press; … the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and [the right] to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”
224

Reinhardt, supra note 78, at 47; see also LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279
F.3d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (stating that “First Amendment judicial scrutiny should now be at its height
[for] any … person who disapproves of one or more of our nation’s officials or policies
for any reason whatsoever”).
225

See Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y.
Times, June 30, 2018 (citing commentators on both sides of the ideological divide);
see also Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Still Matters, 87 Brook. L. Rev. 195, 200 (2021)
(noting “sea change shift in the support for free speech”).
226

Prominent examples include Americans for Prosperity Fdn. v. Bonta, 141 S.
Ct. 2373 (2021); Janus v. AFCSME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018); and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
227

Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76. The phenomenon is not limited to
free speech. See infra Part IV.G.
228
229

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 306-16, 320-28.
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Because of this development, determining whether the Ninth
Circuit used the en banc process to promote liberal outcomes in the
realm of free speech presents a special challenge. In contrast to the
areas previously discussed, there is often a question about which
outcome should be deemed “liberal.” For this study, to determine the
ideological direction of the First Amendment panel decisions that were
the subject of an en banc ballot, I used a three-step approach. I started
with the presumption – consistent with the traditional alignment –
that a decision in favor of the constitutional claim is a liberal decision;
a decision against the claim is conservative. Next, I looked to the
positions taken by the liberal and conservative blocs on the Supreme
Court over the past quarter-century, as detailed in the 2020 article. If
the case involved one of the reverse polarity issues – for example,
campaign finance regulation – I took that as strong evidence that
support for the constitutional claim is now the conservative position.
Finally, I considered the identity of the Ninth Circuit judges on
opposing sides in the particular case.
In this final stage, I drew on the analysis in the preceding pages of
issues that reflect the traditional ideological alignment. That analysis
shows, first, that ideology correlates strongly with the party of the
appointing President; and second, that the same judges generally stake
out positions on one side or the other of the ideological divide
irrespective of the issue. Based on those findings, I was able to identify
liberal and conservative blocs on the Ninth Circuit. And if a First
Amendment claim received more support from the conservative bloc
than from the liberals, I could generally classify the case as one
involving reverse polarity. In more personal terms, if a case pitted
Judge Reinhardt against Judge O’Scannlain, it is fair to say (in the
absence of contrary evidence) that the position taken by Judge
Reinhardt is the liberal position, while the position taken by Judge
O’Scannlain is the conservative position.
This method did not yield answers for all cases. If there was some
evidence suggesting a departure from the traditional alignment but
also contrary evidence, or if the judges did not divide on liberalconservative lines, I generally refrained from characterizing the
ideological direction of the panel decision or the en banc call.
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During the period of the study, 59 panel opinions on freedom of
expression were the subject of an en banc ballot. (See Table 6.) Analysis
reveals that the patterns were quite different from any of the other
areas discussed thus far.
Table 6
En Banc Ballots: Freedom of Expression
Total
Traditional alignment

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

38

Conservative Panel Decision

27

8

19

30%

Liberal Panel Decision

11

2

9

18%

Conservative Panel Decision

6

3

3

50%

Liberal Panel Decision

9

1

8

11%

6

4

2

67%

59

18

41

31%

Reverse polarity

Other Panel Decision
Total

15

1. Traditional-alignment cases
I begin with the cases in which there is no evidence to suggest
anything other than the traditional ideological alignment. There were
38 such cases – about two-thirds of the total. In 27 cases, the panel
decision was conservative, i.e. it rejected the First Amendment claim.
Only eight of those calls were successful, for a grant rate of 30%. That
is little more than half the grant rate for conservative panel decisions
on issues of constitutional criminal procedure.
In five of the eight cases in which rehearing was granted, the
LEBC reversed the panel outcome and sustained the First Amendment
claim. For example, two LEBC decisions struck down city ordinances
regulating expressive activity on public property. 230 Another overruled
See Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657
F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting solicitation of
business, employment, or contributions on streets and highways); Berger v, City of
Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting several rules promulgated
by city to regulate the behavior of street performers at a public park and
entertainment complex).
230
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a precedent limiting the First Amendment rights of public
employees. 231 One case rejected the First Amendment claim by a vote of
6 to 5; 232 two appeals were mooted.
Ten of the 19 failed calls targeting conservative decisions
generated dissentals. The judges who wrote or joined these dissentals
were overwhelmingly appointees of Democratic Presidents, but Judge
Kozinski wrote or joined five of them. The dissents typically argued
that the panel decision flouted Supreme Court precedent protecting
freedom of speech. Here are three examples, all joined by Judges
Pregerson and Reinhardt, among others:
• “This is the case that put the Cult Awareness Network out of
business and silenced its message. It is a bitter object lesson in
the dangers of ignoring the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.” 233
• “The panel's decision is in square conflict with the very Supreme
Court precedent upon which it relies, and will permit
administrators to impede parties seeking to engage in First
Amendment-protected activity on private property.” 234

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The other
LEBC decisions that reversed conservative panel outcomes were United States v.
Swisher, 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (striking down federal statute that
criminalized the unauthorized wearing of military medals); and Norse v. City of
Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (reversing sua sponte grant of
summary judgment against individual who was ejected from city council meeting
and arrested after giving the council a silent Nazi salute). The statute struck down
in Swisher was amended after the events giving rise to the case; that probably
explains why the Solicitor General did not seek Supreme Court review.
231

Villegas v. City of Gilroy, 541 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that
motorcycle club members who were expelled from garlic festival in city park for
violating festival’s dress code failed to show state action).
232

Scott v. Ross, 151 F.3d 1247, 1248 (1998) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1982)). Judge Kozinski and Judge Kleinfeld were the only Republican-appointed
judges to join the dissental.
233

Southern Oregon Barter Fair v. Jackson Cty., 401 F.3d 1124, 1124 (9th Cir.
2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
234
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•

“In [two] cases, the [Supreme] Court laid out strict rules that
the government must follow [before turning what would
otherwise be protected First Amendment speech into criminal
conduct], yet the designation in this case complies [with] neither
[case].” 235

In 11 cases the en banc call targeted a panel decision that would
be characterized as liberal in the traditional typology. Only two such
calls were successful. In one, the LEBC rejected the claim; 236 in the
other, the appeal was dismissed without a decision by the LEBC. 237 As
for the denials, six were accompanied by dissentals; overwhelmingly,
these were written and joined by Republican appointees. These dissents
emphasized practical consequences as well as precedent. For example:
• “[The panel] decision hamstrings Secret Service agents, who
must now choose between ensuring the safety of the President
and subjecting themselves to First Amendment liability.” 238
• “In adopting an unprecedented view of the First Amendment
and labeling it “serious” …, the panel has erected another
hurdle to carrying out valid death penalties….” 239
• “[I]n a wonderful display of why federal judges should not be
running jails, the majority dismisses out of hand many practical
United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
235

See Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (upholding jail
policy prohibiting inmates from possessing “sexually explicit material”).
236

See Bernstein v. United States, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.) (affirming judgment
enjoining enforcement of federal regulations that limited plaintiff’s ability to
distribute encryption software), rehearing granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
The appeal was dismissed before the rehearing took place because the government
announced plans to issue new regulations. See 2004 WL 838163 at *2 n. 2 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 19, 2004).
237

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 954 (9th Cir. 2013) (O’Scannlain,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The panel decision was reversed by
the Supreme Court sub nom. Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744 (2014).
238

Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1056, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (Callahan, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). The Supreme Court in effect reversed the panel
order. 573 U.S. 976 (2014).
239
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concerns that will arise from requiring jails to distribute an
unknown quantity of unsolicited mail.” 240
Looking only at the traditional-alignment cases, one would
conclude that the en banc process operated to promote a liberal
jurisprudence – but only in a modest way. Five of the seven cases that
were decided on the merits by an en banc court ruled in favor of the
First Amendment claim. But the grant rate was low for both liberal and
conservative panel decisions.
2. Reverse-polarity cases
The First Amendment en banc calls also included 15 cases
involving reverse polarity issues. In six, the panel decision sustained
the constitutional claim; in nine, the claim was rejected.
In three of the cases in the first group, the en banc call was
successful, and in each the LEBC reversed the panel outcome and
upheld the regulation. The cases involved a disclosure requirement
related to ballot initiatives, 241 religious speech on public property, 242
and a ban on public issue and political advertisements on public
broadcast stations. 243
Two of the en banc calls that failed to dislodge decisions sustaining
free-speech claims implicated even more directly the Supreme Court’s
reverse-polarity jurisprudence. 244 In one, a divided panel struck down a
Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
240

See Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F,3d
671 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J.), on rehearing en banc, 782 F.3d 520 (9th Cir.
2015).
241

See Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2000), on rehearing en
banc, 244 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001). The LEBC held that the free-speech claim was
properly rejected based on the Establishment Clause. 244 F.3d at 1067.
242

See Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 676 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2012)
(Bea, J.), on rehearing en banc, 736 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2013).
243

The third case, in which a liberal judge voted to reject the First Amendment
claim, can be viewed as implicating “economic liberalism.” See McDermott v.
Ampersand Publishing Co., 593 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying injunction
sought by NLRB “in support of union activity aimed at obtaining editorial control”
because it “pose[d] a threat of violating the rights of [the newspaper] under the First
Amendment; id. at 966 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he injunction
244
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state law that prohibited direct corporate expenditures in ballot
initiative campaigns. 245 In the other, the panel held, over the dissent of
Judge Berzon, that a public high school violated a student’s First
Amendment rights by denying her Bible club the same rights and
benefits as other student clubs in the district. 246
The more numerous cases were those in which the panel rejected
the First Amendment claim. In that group, only one en banc call was
successful. The case involved what the dissenting judge called “the flip
side” of a Supreme Court reverse polarity decision. 247 The LEBC ended
up remanding to the three-judge panel without ruling on the merits. 248
In the other eight cases the en banc call failed; in all eight,
Republican-appointed judges (sometimes joined by Judge Tallman)
filed opinions dissenting from the denial of rehearing. 249 These

addresses terms and conditions of employment, and it leaves the [newspaper’s] right
to publish its desired content entirely intact”). For discussion of economic liberalism,
see infra Part IV.H.
Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2000). The order denying rehearing en banc can be found in the certiorari petition.
Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
245

Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). The panel majority also
rejected the school’s argument that allowing access would violate the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 1092-94. Compare Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S.
98 (2001).
246

See Jerry Beeman & Pharm. Services, Inc. v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt,
LLC, 652 F.3d 1085, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (citing Sorrell v.
IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011)).
247

Jerry Beeman & Pharm. Services, Inc. v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt, LLC,
741 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
248

In one instance the opinion challenging the panel decision was filed when the
case returned to the Ninth Circuit in a later stage of the litigation. See Kennedy v.
Bremerton Sch. Dist., 4 F.4th 910, 930 (9th Cir. 2021) (opinion of O’Scannlain, J.,
respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that panel decision “obliterates …
constitutional protections” for public school teachers and coaches). The study group
case was Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting
First Amendment claim by public high school football coach who was fired for
engaging in prayer on football field immediately after games), rehearing en banc
denied, 880 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2018). In January 2022 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case. 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022).
249
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dissentals add to our understanding of the new liberal-conservative
divide on freedom of speech.
The cases ranged widely over First Amendment issues. 250 Here I
will highlight four in which five or more judges joined the dissental.
• Lair v. Motl. 251 A divided panel upheld a state law limiting the
amount of money that individuals, political action committees,
and political parties may contribute to candidates for state
office. Judge Ikuta, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc,
argued that the panel flouted Supreme Court precedent
requiring the state to “present evidence of actual or apparent
quid pro quo corruption” before limiting contributions. 252
• Harper v. Poway Unified School District. 253 A public high school
permitted the Gay-Straight Alliance, a student group, to hold a
“Day of Silence” at the school. The next day, school officials
prohibited a student from wearing a T-shirt with messages that
the officials believed addressed homosexual students in “a
derogatory manner.” 254 The panel, in an opinion by Judge
Reinhardt, held that the school did not violate the student’s
In addition to the Kennedy case discussed supra note 249 and the decisions
discussed in text, the cases are: Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unif. Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d
764, 766 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (stating that panel decision “condon[es] the suppression of free speech by some
students because other students might have reacted violently”); Pickup v. Brown,
740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc) (arguing that panel decision enables legislature to “avoid First Amendment
judicial scrutiny by defining disfavored talk as ‘conduct’”); and Truth v. Kent Sch.
Dist., 551 F.3d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc) (arguing that the panel majority “confus[es] the school's viewpoint-neutral
right to limit speech in a limited public forum with a necessarily viewpoint-affecting
regulation of the right freely to associate to express one's views”).
250

251

873 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2017).

Lair v. Motl, 889 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2018) (Ikuta, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019).
252
253

445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).

Id. at 1172 (summarizing principal’s comments to student). The T-shirt read,
“BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED”
handwritten on the front, and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL” handwritten on
the back. See id. at 1170-71.
254
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First Amendment rights. Judge O’Scannlain and four other
judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing
that the panel decision “permit[s] school administrators to
engage in viewpoint discrimination on the basis of a student's
newly promulgated right to be free from certain offensive
speech.” 255
• Faith Center Evangelistic Center Ministries v. Glover. 256 A
county made its public library meeting rooms available to nonprofit groups during operating hours, but denied access to an
evangelical Christian church seeking to conduct, among other
activities, religious worship services. The panel, in an opinion by
Judge Paez, reversed the district court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction. Seven judges joined Judge Bybee’s dissent arguing
that the panel decision “ratifies viewpoint-based discrimination”
and “privileg[es] some religious groups over others.” 257
• Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra. 258 The state
attorney general required nonprofit organizations that solicited
tax-deductible contributions in the state to disclose the names
and addresses of their largest contributors. The panel rejected
the organizations’ claim that the requirement violated their
right to freedom of association. Judge Ikuta, in a dissental
joined by four other judges, insisted that the panel decision
“eviscerates the First Amendment protections long-established

Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 455 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Reinhardt
defended the panel decision, arguing that “it is surely not beyond the authority of
local school boards to attempt to protect young minority students against verbal
persecution.” Id. at 1053 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
The Supreme Court vacated the panel opinion with directions to dismiss the appeal
as moot. 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
255

256

462 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2006).

Faith Center Evangelistic Center Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 901 (9th
Cir. 2007) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 822 (2007).
257

258

2018).

Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.
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by the Supreme Court” and “puts anyone with controversial
views at risk.” 259
The most striking aspect of these cases is that dissentals from the
conservative side protesting panel decisions that rejected First
Amendment claims actually outnumbered those challenging decisions
that sustained First Amendment claims (eight versus six). As will be
seen, these cases are part of a broader and important development in
American constitutional law: the embrace of a robust rights-protective
jurisprudence by conservative judges and scholars. 260
3. First Amendment fluidity
The emergence of reverse polarity is not the only reason why the
realm of free speech presents a special challenge in determining
whether the Ninth Circuit used the en banc process to promote liberal
outcomes. In addition to the 15 reverse-polarity cases, there were six
cases – four grants and two denials – in which I could not confidently
characterize the ideological direction of the panel decision.
The most interesting of these is Planned Parenthood v. American
Coalition of Life Activists. 261 A jury awarded more than $100,000,000 in
damages to abortion providers whose names and addresses were posted
on a website by anti-abortion activists. The panel, in a unanimous
opinion by Judge Kozinski, applied the Supreme Court decision in
Claiborne Hardware 262 and found that the jury award violated the First
Amendment. 263 Rehearing en banc was granted, and the LEBC, by a
vote of 6 to 5, rejected the First Amendment claim under the “true
threat” exception to protected speech. 264 Five of the majority judges
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, 919 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th
Cir. 2019) (Ikuta, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The Supreme
Court reversed sub nom. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct.
2373 (2021).
259

260

See infra Part IV.G.

Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of
Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
261
262

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).

263

The other members of the panel were Judge Kleinfeld and a visiting judge.

Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
264
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were Democratic appointees. The dissenters included Judge Reinhardt
and Judge Berzon, two prominent members of the liberal bloc, and also
Judge O’Scannlain, the leader of the conservative cohort. 265
If the panel decision stood alone, I would simply classify it as a
liberal ruling in the traditional mold. But the lineup in the en banc
court casts the case in a different light. I recognize, of course, that
“conservative [judges] often render [or join] so-called liberal opinions,
and vice versa.” 266 In this study, however, the object is to determine
whether a group of judges has acted in a particular way. When there is
disagreement and fragmentation within the group in a particular case,
as there is here, the case loses its probative value for the inquiry.
Three cases involved commercial speech, and one involved judicial
campaign speech. Both are reverse-polarity issues in the Supreme
Court, 267 but the alignments in the Ninth Circuit followed different
patterns. In the realm of commercial speech, members of the
conservative bloc voted to support the First Amendment claims, but so
did members of the liberal cohort. 268 When judicial campaign speech
was at issue, the panel judges’ positions reflected the traditional
ideological alignment, not reverse polarity. 269
The other dissenters were Judge Kozinski and Judge Kleinfeld, Republican
appointees who sometimes voted on the liberal side in en banc ballot cases that
reflected traditional polarity.
265

See Ray A. Brown, Police Power – Legislation for Health and Personal Safety,
42 Harv. L. Rev. 866, 869 (1929); see also Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76,
at 299-300.
266

267

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 308-11, 315-16.

See, e.g., Am. Beverage Assn. v. City of San Francisco, 871 F.3d 884 (9th Cir.
2017) (Ikuta, J.) (sustaining challenge to ordinance requiring health warnings on
advertisements for certain sugar-sweetened beverages), on rehearing en banc, 916
F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019) (reaching same result) (unanimous decision).
268

See Wolfson v. Concannon, 750 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2014) (Paez, J., joined by
Berzon, J.) (holding that several provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct
unconstitutionally restricted the speech of non-judge candidates); id. at 1167
(Tallman, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that three of the rules were constitutional).
The court granted en banc rehearing, but before the en banc argument, the Supreme
Court handed down a decision that all members of the LEBC, including Judge
Berzon, agreed foreclosed the constitutional claims. Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d
1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
269
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One case was sui generis. The panel held that a public high school
did not violate a student’s First Amendment rights when it “emergency
expelled” him based on a poem he wrote about school shootings. 270
Judge Reinhardt, the “liberal lion,” dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc, agreeing with another dissental that the school had
punished the student for protected speech. 271 The complication is that
the panel opinion upholding the suspension was joined by a “liberal
lioness” of the Ninth Circuit, Judge Betty Binns Fletcher. 272 With no
public information about the position of other judges, it is impossible to
say whether the denial of rehearing resulted in a liberal outcome.
Putting those cases aside, we are left with 53 cases for
consideration. As already noted, analysis limited to the 38 cases
reflecting the traditional ideological alignment suggested that the en
banc process operated in a modest way to promote a liberal
jurisprudence on free-speech issues. But in 11 of the 15 reverse polarity
cases, the process ended with rejection of the constitutional claim – i.e.,
the liberal position prevailed. Thus, overall, the push in a liberal
direction was more than modest.
G. Reverse Polarity Issues
In the realm of freedom of expression, as the preceding section has
shown, we find both reverse polarity and the traditional ideological
alignment, depending on the particular issue. But in some other areas
of civil rights litigation, reverse polarity is now the dominant pattern,
at least in the United States Supreme Court. 273 Here I look at the
Ninth Circuit’s en balloting on five constitutional claims that my study
of the Supreme Court identified as reverse polarity issues: affirmative
action, personal jurisdiction, the free exercise of religion, the Takings

270

LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001).

LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see id. at 725-26 (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
271

See John Roemer, Liberal legal lioness known for being bold, vigorous, Daily
Journal (S.F.), Oct. 24, 2012, at 1.
272
273

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76.
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Clause, and the Second Amendment. Because the concept is so novel, I
consider each of the issues separately.
1. Affirmative action
Only two cases challenging affirmative action programs under the
Equal Protection Clause were the subject of en banc ballots in the 23
years of the study. The first was Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson.274
The case was initially heard by a panel composed of three Republican
appointees including Judge O’Scannlain. The panel held that a
California statute “setting goals for ethnic and sex characteristics of
construction subcontractors” violated the Constitution. 275 There was a
sua sponte call for en banc rehearing, but it failed to receive a
majority. 276 Judge Reinhardt filed a passionate dissent, attacking the
panel for “striking down a benign governmental outreach program that
is intended to ensure a modicum of fairness to minorities and
women.” 277
A few years later, a divided panel held that Seattle’s use of a
“racial tiebreaker” to choose among student applicants for admission to
“the City's most popular public high schools” violated “the equal
protection mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 278 The opinion was
by Judge O’Scannlain. This time the en banc call was successful, and
the LEBC upheld the Seattle program by a vote of 7 to 4. 279 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, with all four liberal Justices
dissenting. 280
274

125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997).

275

Id. at 703.

276

Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 138 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1998).

Id. at 1273 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Judges Pregerson and Tashima joined the dissent, and Judge Hawkins dissented
separately. Judge Reinhardt had signaled his position a year earlier in his article
defining the “liberal judge.” See supra note 79.
277

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d
949, 953, 988 (9th Cir. 2004).
278

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162 (9th Cir. 2005).
279

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007).
280
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Also relevant here is a rare example of a statutory reverse polarity
case. In Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, a private school in Hawaii that
received no federal funds effectively restricted admission “to those
descended from the Hawaiian race.” 281 The panel majority, composed of
two Republican appointees, held that the school’s policy, “premised
upon an express racial classification,” violated 42 U.S.C. 1981, the
modern descendant of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 282 The full court
granted en band rehearing, and the LEBC rejected the statutory
challenge. 283 The vote was 8 to 7; the dissenters included Judge
O’Scannlain and all other participating members of the court’s
conservative bloc. 284
The lineups in these cases leave no doubt that affirmative action
has the same ideological valence in the Ninth Circuit as it does in the
Supreme Court; as Professor Lawrence Baum has put it, “support for
affirmative action and similar programs is seen as a liberal position.” 285
But the question here is whether the Ninth Circuit has used the en
banc process to promote that position. Even including Doe, there were
only three cases in the 23-year period. What we know is that in the two
most recent cases, the liberal position prevailed both in the en banc
ballot and in the LEBC decision. And in Monterey Mechanical, there is
strong evidence that, at the time of the en banc vote, Democratic
appointees did not constitute a majority of the court. 286
281

Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005).

282

Id. at 1030.

283

Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

The plaintiffs filed a certiorari petition in the Supreme Court, but the parties
stipulated to a dismissal. See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 550 U.S. 931 (2007).
284

Baum, supra note 85, at 166 (punctuation altered). Professor Baum was
speaking generally about “political elites,” but that group includes Supreme Court
Justices.
285

The evidence is found in Judge Reinhardt’s dissental in that case. Seeking an
“explanation … for allowing an opinion that is wholly without legal merit to become
the law of the circuit,” Judge Reinhardt noted that “we now have only 18 active
judges when we should have 28.” Monterey Mechanical, 138 F.3d at 1279 & n. 15.
The dissental was issued on March 9, 1998, by which time the court had 19 active
judges. The en banc vote must have been taken earlier – and at a time when the
court was evenly divided between Republican and Democratic appointees, with nine
of each. See supra note 32.
286
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2. Personal jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction might seem like an odd bedfellow for
traditional civil rights issues like freedom of speech and freedom of
religion. But the Supreme Court has emphasized that the requirement
of personal jurisdiction in civil suits flows from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the requirement “recognizes
and protects an individual liberty interest.” 287 That “liberty interest”
has generally received more support from conservative Justices than
from the liberals, making it a reverse polarity issue. 288
Four cases on personal jurisdiction were the subject of en banc
ballots during the period of the study. In two cases the panel rejected
the due process claim, a judge called for an en banc vote, and the call
failed. Dissentals joined by members of the conservative bloc were filed
in both cases. In Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., Judge O’Scannlain
argued that “the panel drastically expands the reach of personal
jurisdiction beyond all constitutional bounds.” 289 In Fiore v. Walden,
Judge O’Scannlain denounced the panel opinion in similar terms; 290 a
dissent by Judge Margaret McKeown accused the panel majority of
endorsing a “virtually limitless expansion of personal jurisdiction [that]
runs afoul of both due process guarantees and Supreme Court

Judge Reinhardt’s comment is noteworthy in another respect. It is hard to
understand how Judge Reinhardt would have thought that the vacancies were part
of the explanation for the denial of rehearing unless he believed that judges
appointed by President Clinton would have voted in favor of the en banc call. And
one can see why he might have thought that; two of the three Clinton appointees on
the court at the time of the vote did write or join dissentals.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982) (emphasis added). See also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
126 (2014) (emphasizing centrality of the conception of “fair play and substantial
justice” to jurisdictional analysis).
287

288

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 303-04.

Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 2011)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
289

Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 562 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
290
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precedent.” 291 Both panel decisions were reversed by the Supreme
Court. 292
The other two cases are each sui generis. Both were decided
initially by the same panel, and in both the court granted en banc
rehearing. In one, the panel rejected the due process claim. 293 The
LEBC found that the action had been rendered moot by a settlement,
and it did not decide “the important issues of personal jurisdiction
originally raised by [the] appeal.” 294 In the other case, the panel held
that the foreign defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction.295
On rehearing en banc, the LEBC fractured. Eight judges, disagreeing
with the panel’s determination, found that personal jurisdiction was
proper, but three of them concluded that the dispute was not ripe.
Their votes, together with the three votes rejecting personal
jurisdiction, resulted in a dismissal of the action. 296
The grant of en banc rehearing in the case that became moot
shows that balloting by the full court does not always promote liberal
outcomes in this area of the law. 297 Still, it is impossible not to be
struck by the parallel trajectories in Bauman and Fiore. In both cases,
the panel reached a liberal result; Judge O’Scannlain (and, in Fiore,
Judge McKeown) insisted that the panel decision “violated due process
guarantees;” 298 a majority of the full court voted against en banc
291

Id. at 568 (McKeown, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.
277 (2014).
292
293

Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003).

294

Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contra le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120
(9th Cir. 2004).
295

Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contra le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
296

The case involving foreign defendants does seem to fit the expected
paradigm. To be sure, the conservative panel result was supported by two liberal
judges (Ferguson and Tashima). However, the full court voted to grant rehearing,
and in the LEBC, a majority of the liberal judges rejected the panel’s conclusion that
the exercise of jurisdiction was improper.
297

Fiore, 688 F.3d at 568 (McKeown, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc; see also Bauman, 676 F.3d at 777 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of
298
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rehearing; but the arguments that failed to persuade the Ninth
Circuit’s judges persuaded the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and
reverse. 299
3. Free exercise of religion
When governmental practices are challenged as violating the
Establishment Clause, the traditional ideological alignment continues
to hold sway: a decision supporting the constitutional claim is a liberal
decision, and a decision rejecting the claim is conservative. 300 In the
Warren and Burger Court eras, that was also true of claims challenging
government practices under the Free Exercise Clause. 301
Not so in the Roberts Court. Today, support for free exercise
claims is regarded as the conservative position, to the point where
liberal commentators speak of “the weaponization of the Free Exercise
Clause” 302 and accuse the Court’s conservative majority of engaging in
“Free Exercise Lochnerism.” 303
What about the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals? During the period
of the study, nine Free Exercise cases were the subject of en banc
ballots. Detailed analysis is required to determine how the liberal and
conservative cohorts viewed the issues and whether the liberal position
generally prevailed. 304
rehearing en banc) (noting “the bedrock concerns of fundamental fairness that
underpin Supreme Court due process jurisprudence”).
We do not have the memoranda circulated to the court in advance of the
votes on the en banc calls, but as noted in Part II, the internal memoranda generally
provide the basis for the published opinions dissenting from denial of rehearing.
299

See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); see also Baum,
supra note 85, at 172.
300
301

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 316-17.

See Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Weaponization of the Free
Exercise
Clause,
The
Atlantic,
Sept.
18,
2020.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/weaponization-free-exerciseclause/616373/.
302

303

(2015).

See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1453

One case, involving the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, “pit[ted] the
federal government's efforts to save the bald eagle from extinction against the bird's
profound significance to Native spirituality.” United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919,
304
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Only one of the nine cases unquestionably reflected traditional
polarity – and the liberal position did not prevail. In Rich v. Woodford,
early in the study period, a capital defendant filed an emergency
motion seeking to take part in a sweat lodge ceremony prior to his
execution. The district court denied the motion, and a Ninth Circuit
panel affirmed. 305 A judge made a sua sponte call for an en banc vote,
but a majority did not vote for rehearing. Judge Reinhardt, joined by
three other judges, dissented, arguing that “neither the Constitution
nor human decency permits us to deny a condemned man his last rites
based on the implausible security concerns advanced by the state.” 306
Three cases early in the study period anticipated reverse polarity
decisions by the Supreme Court. In Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Commission, Alaska housing laws prohibited apartment owners from
refusing to rent to unmarried couples. 307 The panel majority, in an
opinion by Judge O’Scannlain, held that the Free Exercise Clause
precluded the state from enforcing the laws against landlords, like the
plaintiffs, whose refusal was based on religious reasons. 308 Judge
Michael Daly Hawkins, a Clinton appointee, dissented. He challenged
the majority’s constitutional holding; he also insisted that the case was
not ripe for judicial decision. 309 The full court granted en banc
rehearing, and the LEBC unanimously held that the action should be

920 (9th Cir. 2003) (rehearing en banc denied). It is debatable which side is the
liberal position. The case is therefore excluded from the analysis that follows.
Neither the district court ruling nor the appellate affirmance was published.
The public docket reveals that the panel members were Judge Pregerson (who joined
the dissent from denial of en banc rehearing), Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, and Judge
Michael Daly Hawkins.
305

Rich v. Woodford, 210 F.3d 961, 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
306
307

1999).

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.

Id. at 718. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
308

165 F.3d at 718 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority’s approach
“ought to alarm any serious student of judicial restraint”).
309
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dismissed as premature. 310 The LEBC thus did not rule on the free
exercise question.
In KDM v. Reedsport School District, the plaintiff was a “child
with disabilities” entitled to special services under federal and state
law. 311 The school district was willing to provide the services to KDM,
but not at the sectarian school that he attended, because a state
regulation restricted the provision of services to “religiously neutral
setting[s].” 312 The panel majority, in an opinion joined by Judge
Hawkins, found no free exercise violation. Judge O’Scannlain,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, argued that “a law
that is non-neutral on its face, like the Oregon regulation at issue here,
triggers strict (and almost always fatal) scrutiny – even in the absence
of extrinsic evidence suggesting that the law was the result of antireligious bigotry or animus.” 313
The third case was Davey v. Locke. 314 Davey applied for and
received a state-funded “Promise Scholarship” for attendance at an
accredited college. The state then denied him the scholarship solely
because he was pursuing a degree in devotional theology. The panel
majority held that the denial violated the Free Exercise Clause. Judge
Margaret M. McKeown, a Clinton appointee, dissented. A judge
requested a vote on en banc rehearing, but the vote failed. 315 No

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc). Judge O’Scannlain concurred, stating that the en banc opinion
“commendably reshapes this circuit's overly permissive jurisprudence of ripeness
and standing by tightening the requirements for bringing lawsuits.” Id. at 1142
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
310

311

KDM v. Reedsport School District, 196 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).

312

Id. at 1048. Compare Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246

(2020).

KDM v. Reedsport School District, 210 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
313
314

299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).

The order is not published, but it is available in the appendix to the
certiorari petition in the Supreme Court.
315
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dissental was published; however, the Supreme Court reversed the
panel decision over the dissent of the two most conservative Justices. 316
The other four cases all involved variants on a single issue – the
“ministerial exception” to state and federal employment laws. 317 The
cases extend over almost the entire span of the study period, starting
with Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus. 318 The panel,
in an opinion by Judge W. Fletcher, held that the ministerial exception
did not bar a novice’s sexual harassment claim against the Jesuit
religious order. Four judges, including Judge O’Scannlain, dissented
from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing that the panel decision
“narrow[ed] the ministerial exception nearly to the point of
extinction.” 319
Bollard was followed a few years later by the similar case of Elvig
v. Calvin Presbyterian Church. 320 Again the panel held that the
ministerial exception did not bar a sexual harassment claim. This time
six judges, including Judge O’Scannlain, dissented from denial of
rehearing en banc. 321 Judge W. Fletcher, although not a member of the
panel, defended the panel decision as “consistent with the
constitutional underpinnings of the ministerial exception.” 322
In neither Ballard nor Elvig did the court announce a test for
determining whether an employee is a “minister” under the ministerial
exception. A panel attempted that task in 2010 in Alcazar v.
Corporation of the Catholic Bishop of Seattle. 323 Applying the test, the
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); see id. at 726 (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting). This was one of the few cases in which the Supreme Court
reversed a Ninth Circuit decision with a conservative outcome.
316

The ministerial exception is grounded in both the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause, but commentators generally put it in the “free exercise”
category, and I follow suit. See, e.g., Gillman & Chemerinsky, supra note 302.
317

318

196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999).

Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 211 F.3d 1331, 1331
(2000) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
319
320

375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004).

Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
321
322

Id. at 790 (W. Fletcher, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

323

598 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2010).
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panel found that the exception barred the plaintiff’s claim under the
state minimum wage act. The full court granted rehearing en banc. The
LEBC unanimously found that the plaintiff was a minister “under any
reasonable interpretation of the exception.” 324 It vacated the panel’s
effort to announce a test but did not formulate one of its own.
It was not until 2012 that the Supreme Court, in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 325 finally confirmed
the existence of the ministerial exception. The Court held that the
exception applied in the case before it, but it gave little guidance as to
how the exception would apply in other cases.
Six years later, in Biel v. St. James School, a Ninth Circuit panel
held that the exception did not bar a suit under the Americans with
Disabilities Act by a fifth grade teacher at a Catholic school. 326 Eight
judges – all appointed by Republican Presidents – dissented from the
denial of rehearing en banc. They argued that the panel’s decision
“embrace[d] the narrowest construction of the First Amendment's
‘ministerial exception’ and split[] from the consensus of our sister
circuits that the employee's ministerial function should be the key
focus.” 327 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, with two
liberal Justices dissenting. 328
Two conclusions emerge from this account. First, when there was
disagreement within the court, the free exercise claim generally
received more support from members of the conservative cohort than
from members of the liberal bloc. (The sweat lodge case is the one clear
exception.) Judge O’Scannlain in particular championed a robust
interpretation of the clause’s protections. So it is fair to say that in the
Ninth Circuit as in the Supreme Court, free exercise controversies in

Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
324
325

565 U.S. 171 (2012).

326

Biel v. St. James School, 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018).

Biel v. St. James School, 926 F.3d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 2019) (R. Nelson, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
327

See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020);
id. at 2017 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting)..
328
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the twenty-first century have generally reflected reverse polarity rather
than the traditional alignment.
Second, taking into account both the en banc balloting and the
decisions by the LEBCs, we generally do not find an aggressive effort to
promote liberal outcomes. In Rich and in Davey the conservative
position prevailed in the vote on rehearing. In the two cases that did go
en banc – Thomas and Alcazar – the LEBC declined to rule on the
controversial questions on which the panel had issued conservative
decisions. Only in the area of the ministerial exception did the full
court resist efforts from the conservative side to strengthen the Free
Exercise Clause as a limitation on governmental power. 329
4. The Takings Clause
In 1994, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion of the Court from
which all four liberal Justices dissented, declared: “We see no reason
why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the
Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should
be relegated to the status of a poor relation in … comparable
circumstances.” 330 A quarter-century later, his successor, Chief Justice
Roberts, invoked that language in overruling a precedent that
obstructed the litigation of takings claims in federal court. 331
Overruling was necessary, he said, to “restor[e] takings claims to the
full-fledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned when they
included the Clause among the other protections in the Bill of
Rights.” 332 Again the four liberal Justices – three of whom were not on
the Court at the time of the earlier decision – dissented. 333
Subsequent to the study period, the court rejected an en banc call from the
conservative side in a free exercise case growing out of the COVID-19 pandemic. A
public school district implemented a vaccine mandate for its students and denied a
request for a religious exemption. A divided three-judge panel found no
constitutional violation. Ten judges – all appointed by Republican Presidents –
dissented from the denial of rehearing. See Doe v. San Diego Unif. Sch. Dist., 22
F.4th 1099, 1100, 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2022) (opinions of Bumatay, Bress, & Forrest,
JJ., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
329

330

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).

331

Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2019).

332

Id. at 2170.

333

Id. at 2180 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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As these cases illustrate, the Takings Clause is a reverse-polarity
issue in the Supreme Court. 334 The same holds true in the Ninth
Circuit: in en banc proceedings, takings claims are generally supported
by members of the conservative bloc and rejected by members of the
liberal cohort. And with one difficult-to-classify exception, the liberal
position has invariably prevailed.
Six Takings Clause cases were the subject of en banc ballots
during the period of the study. In three of the cases, the panel rejected
the takings claim. In all three, the en banc call failed to receive a
majority, and members of the conservative bloc wrote or joined dissents
from the denial of rehearing.
The first case, early in the study period, involved a challenge to a
temporary planning moratorium enacted by the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt, held
that the moratorium did not effect either a categorical taking or a
regulatory taking under Penn Central. 335 Six Republican-appointed
judges, including Judge O’Scannlain, joined a dissental arguing that
“[t]he panel's desire to ease local governance does not justify approving
means that violate rights secured by the Fifth Amendment as
authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court. 336 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed, with three of the conservative
Justices dissenting. 337
The other two cases were decided toward the end of the study
period. In Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, plaintiffs challenged a state
regulation that allowed union organizers to enter agricultural employer
worksites under specified circumstances. 338 The panel, in an opinion by
See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 301-03; see also Baum,
supra note 85, at 130-61.
334

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000).
335

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
228 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
336

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,,
535 U.S. 302 (2002); see id. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
337
338

Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Judge Paez joined by Judge W. Fletcher, rejected the plaintiffs’ claim
that the regulation amounted to a per se taking in that it allowed a
permanent physical invasion of their property. 339 The dissental by
Judge Ikuta, joined by seven other Republican appointees, insisted that
the state had appropriated an easement, thus effecting a permanent
physical occupation and a per se taking. 340 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed, with the three liberal Justices dissenting. 341
Judge Daniel Collins, newly appointed by President Trump, wrote
the dissental in Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco. 342 Plaintiffs
contended that the city’s lifetime lease requirement protecting tenants
in a condominium conversion was an unconstitutional regulatory
taking. The panel held that the takings claim was not ripe because the
plaintiffs had not obtained a final decision regarding the application of
the rule to their unit. 343 The dissental argued that the panel had
imposed an impermissible exhaustion requirement in the guise of
mandating finality. 344 The Supreme Court agreed; it reversed
summarily and without dissent. 345
There were also three cases in which the panel sustained the
takings claim. In two of them, the court granted en banc rehearing and
the LEBC rejected the claim. One case involved a challenge to
Washington State’s Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Account (IOLTA)
program. The panel held that the program effected a per se taking, and
it remanded the case to the district court to determine the “just

339

Id. at 534. Judge Edward Leavy, a Republican appointee, dissented.

Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 956 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2020) (Ikuta, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judges Paez and Fletcher responded to
the dissental, asserting that “the argument advanced by Judge Ikuta fundamentally
misapprehends existing Supreme Court authority.”). Id. at 1163 (Paez, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
340

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021); see id. at 2081
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
341

977 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2020) (Collins, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
342
343

Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 952 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2020).

344

Pakdel, 977 F.3d at 929.

345

Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226 (2021).
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compensation” that was due. 346 The LEBC concluded that “even if the
IOLTA program constituted a taking of … private property, there
would be no Fifth Amendment violation because the value of
[plaintiffs’] just compensation is nil.” 347 The Supreme Court affirmed,
with four of the five conservative Justices dissenting. 348
The second case involved a challenge to a mobile home rent control
ordinance. The panel agreed with the plaintiffs that “the ordinance,
which effect[ed] a transfer of nearly 90 percent of the property value
from mobile home park owners to mobile home tenants, constitute[d] a
regulatory taking” for which just compensation was required. 349 The
LEBC held that the plaintiffs had no viable claim under the Takings
Clause. 350
That brings us to the final case, Fowler v. Guerin. The panel, in an
opinion joined by Judge Ikuta, held that state public school teachers
stated a claim under the Takings Clause because the state failed to pay
daily interest on funds held in interest-bearing accounts as part of the
state retirement system. 351 In contrast to the other two cases upholding
Takings Clause claims, here the en banc call failed. The dissental
argued that the panel “created a Fifth Amendment property right no
court has ever recognized” and that the “decision [was] wholly
untethered to the text of the Fifth Amendment.” 352
What is striking here is that the challenge to the panel decision
came not from the liberal side of the court but from two of the judges
346

2001).

Washington Legal Fdn. v. Legal Fdn. of Wash., 236 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.

Washington Legal Fdn. v. Legal Fdn. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 864 (9th Cir.
2001) (en banc).
347

Brown v. Legal Fdn. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003). As so often happened
during that era, it was the vote of Justice O’Connor that produced a liberal outcome.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003).
348

Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2009); see id. at
1034 (remanding for determination of just compensation).
349
350

Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

351

Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2018).

Fowler v. Guerin, 918 F.3d 644, 645-46 (9th Cir. 2019) (Bennett, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
352
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newly appointed by President Trump – judges who often joined other
Republican-appointed judges in dissentals in other cases. 353 No member
of the liberal cohort joined this dissental. In that light, I have refrained
from characterizing the ideological direction of the Fowler panel
decision. 354
In any event, Fowler is an outlier. In all five of the other Takings
Clause cases that were the subject of an en banc ballot, the liberal
position prevailed and the takings claim was rejected.
5. The Second Amendment
If any area of constitutional litigation can stand as the epitome of
reverse polarity, it is the Second Amendment. In the Supreme Court,
the right to keep and bear arms receives strong support from the
conservative Justices, while the liberal Justices vote to uphold
governmental regulation. 355 And the division within the Court, as
Professor Baum has written, reflects “the liberal-conservative division
on gun policy questions in the elite world as a whole.” 356
In the Ninth Circuit, too, the Second Amendment is a reverse
polarity issue. More strikingly, there is no other issue on which the
Ninth Circuit has more consistently used the en banc process to
produce liberal outcomes. When a panel decision sustaining a Second
Amendment claim is the subject of an en banc ballot, the call is
successful, and the LEBC votes to uphold the law or regulation. When a
panel decision rejecting the claim is the subject of the ballot, the en
banc call (with one possible exception) fails.
The story begins with Silveira v. Lockyer, decided in 2002. 357 The
panel, in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt, rejected the position that “the
For example, Judge R. Nelson joined the dissentals in Cedar Point Nursery
and Pakdel. Judge Bennett joined the dissentals in Ming Dai v. Barr, 940 F.3d 1143
(9th Cir. 2019), discussed supra text accompanying note 170; and Biel v. St. James
School, 926 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2019), discussed supra text accompanying note 327,
among many other cases.
353

354

(2019).

The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Guerin v. Fowler, 140 S. Ct. 390

355

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 319.

356

Baum, supra note 85, at 113.

357

Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Second Amendment establishes an individual right to possess arms.”358
A judge called for a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc, but the
vote failed. 359 Six judges dissented from the denial of rehearing. 360 The
dissenters included Judge Pregerson, who agreed with the panel’s
decision to uphold the challenged law but disputed the panel’s
interpretation of the Second Amendment as protecting only a collective
right. 361 This was the only time in any of the en banc proceedings that
any member of the court’s liberal bloc expressed sympathy for Second
Amendment rights. 362
While the PFREB in Silveira was pending, the case of Nordyke v.
King came before another panel. 363 That panel, bound by circuit
precedent, reiterated the position that the Second Amendment “offers
no protection for the individual's right to bear arms.” 364 But the panel
doubted the correctness of that position and called for en banc
rehearing to reconsider it. This call too failed, with five judges
dissenting from the denial of rehearing. 365

358

Id. at 1065.

359

Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003).

The principal dissent was by Judge Kleinfeld. See id. at 570 (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judges Pregerson, Kozinski, and Gould
also filed opinions. See id. at 568, 502.
360

Id. at 568 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Gould was the only other
Democratic appointee who dissented.
361

In Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc),
discussed infra note 379, Judge Pregerson joined the LEBC opinion rejecting the
Second Amendment claim.
362

Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nordyke I). As will be seen,
the Nordyke litigation extended over several years and generated numerous opinions
and three separate en banc ballots. The numbering here is limited to the
dispositions with opinions that are discussed in this Article.
363

Id. at 1191. The binding precedent, in the panel’s view, was not Silveira but
an earlier decision, Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996). Indeed, the panel
chastised the Silveira panel for reconsidering the issue decided by Hickman and
engaging in an “exposition of the conflicting interpretations of the Second
Amendment [that] was both unpersuasive and, even more importantly,
unnecessary.” Id. at 1192 n.4.
364

Nordyke v. King, 364 F.3d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (Nordyke II)
365
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In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view and held that the Second Amendment
does protect an individual right to bear arms. 366 A year later, a new
iteration of the Nordyke case returned to the same panel. 367 The panel,
in an opinion by Judge O’Scannlain, decided two questions. First, it
held that the Second Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 368 Second, the panel rejected the plaintiffs’
challenge to a county ordinance that effectively prohibited gun shows
on government property. 369
Neither party requested rehearing en banc, but a judge called for a
vote, and a majority voted to rehear the case. 370 Almost certainly, the
purpose of rehearing was to reconsider the panel’s holding that the
Second Amendment is applicable to the states. 371 That reconsideration
proved unnecessary, however, because in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
the Supreme Court resolved the question in accordance with the panel
decision. 372 The LEBC then remanded the case to the three-judge panel,
which articulated a level of scrutiny and allowed the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint to show a Second Amendment violation. 373

366

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

367

Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nordyke III).

368

Id. at 446-57.

369

Id. at 457-63.

370

Nordyke v. King, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).

It is theoretically possible that the en banc call was directed to the panel’s
holding rejecting the challenge to the county ordinance, but I view that possibility as
extremely remote. The panel opinion was by Judge O’Scannlain, a stalwart defender
of Second Amendment rights. It is most unlikely that a majority of the active Ninth
Circuit judges voted for rehearing to revive a claim that Judge O’Scannlain viewed
as without merit. Moreover, the county, in its response to the court’s request for an
expression of views on the en banc call, argued that the panel’s discussion of
incorporation was dictum and that rehearing would be appropriate if the court saw a
risk that the “dictum” would be treated as holding. See Appellees’ Brief Regarding
Rehearing En Banc, Dkt. No. 07-15763, at 3 (June 6, 2009).
371

372

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

373

Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nordyke IV).
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Again Judge O’Scannlain wrote for the panel; here he applied what he
called a “substantial burden framework.” 374
This time the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc. A
judge requested a vote, and a majority of the full court voted to rehear
the case. 375 Although the thrust of the PFREB was that the panel
should have applied strict scrutiny to the Second Amendment claim, it
is hard to believe that the full court granted rehearing because the
judges agreed with the plaintiffs that that very demanding standard
should be the law of the circuit. It is far more likely that a majority
agreed with the panel concurrence that the approach adopted by the
panel majority would lead courts to overturn some “[p]rudent measured
arms restrictions for public safety.” 376
In the end, the LEBC determined that there was no need to
resolve the question of the level of scrutiny; relying on concessions by
the county that gave the plaintiffs pretty much all they wanted, the
LEBC affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Second Amendment
claim. 377 Four members of the court’s conservative bloc, in an opinion
by Judge O’Scannlain, concurred only in the judgment; they endorsed
the standard adopted by the panel majority. 378
The remainder of the story is quickly told. From 2012, when the
LEBC handed down its final opinion in the Nordyke litigation, through
2020, Second Amendment issues were the subject of five en banc calls.
In four cases (including one companion case), the panel ruled in favor of
the Second Amendment claim, the full court granted reheating en banc,
and the LEBC upheld the government regulation. 379 That was also the
374

Id. at 784.

Nordyke v. King, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011). The order states only that a
majority of the nonrecused judges voted to grant en banc rehearing; in conformity
with the court’s usual practice, it does not say that the PFREB was granted.
375

376

Nordyke IV, 644 F.3d at 799 (Gould, J., concurring).

377

Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (Nordyke V).

378

Id. at 1045 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in judgment).

See, in chronological order, Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th
Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J.), on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (good
cause requirement to carry concealed weapon); Richards v. Prieto, 560 Fed. App’x
681 (9th Cir. 2014), on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); Teixeira v.
Cnty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016) (O’Scannlain, J.), on reh’g en banc,
379
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sequence in Duncan v. Bonta, the only Second Amendment en banc call
in 2021. 380 In the fifth case, the panel rejected the Second Amendment
claim and the en banc call failed, with eight judges dissenting from the
denial of rehearing. 381
In all, there were nine occasions on which Second Amendment
issues were the subject of an en banc ballot during the period of the
study, with one more in 2021. Every one of the cases ended with the
rejection of the Second Amendment claim and the upholding of the
challenged law or regulation. 382
6. The overall picture
Table 7 summarizes the numbers for the reverse polarity issues
taken together. It presents a remarkable picture. In no other class of
cases – not even labor and employment law 383 – did the en banc process
serve more thoroughly to produce liberal outcomes. Liberal and
conservative panel decisions were almost equal in numbers – 13 of the
former, 15 of the latter. But only one of the en banc calls targeting a
liberal decision was successful, and that was a case on personal
jurisdiction – hardly a central element of liberal ideology. 384 In contrast,
rehearing was granted to 12 of the panel decisions with a conservative
outcome. The disparity between the grant rates in the two groups of
873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017) (limit on location of gun stores); Young v. Hawaii, 896
F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J.), on reh’g en banc, 992 F.3d 765 (9th Cir.
2021) (right to carry firearm openly for self defense outside home).
See Duncan v. Becerra, 970 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2020), on rehearing en banc
sub nom. Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087 (9th Cir. 2021) (ban on large-capacity
magazines).
380

Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2020); see id. at 1083
(Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
381

In 2022, a panel composed of three Republican-appointed judges held that a
California county violated the Second Amendment during the Covid pandemic by
issuing a series of closure orders that “wholly prevented law-abiding citizens in the
County from realizing their right to keep and bear arms.” McDougall v. Cnty. of
Ventura, 23 F.4th 1095, 1099 (9th Cir 2022). The full court quickly granted en banc
rehearing and vacated the panel decision. 26 F.4th 1016 (9th Cir. 2022). The case is
pending at this writing.
382

383

See supra Part IV.C.

384

See supra notes 293-294 and accompanying text.
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cases – 8% versus 80% – is greater than that of any group encountered
thus far. Moreover, in all of the cases that were taken en banc, the
conservative ruling was repudiated in whole or in part.
Table 7
En Banc Ballots: Reverse Polarity Cases
Total

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

Conservative Panel Decision

15

12

3

80%

Liberal Panel Decision

13

1

12

8%

Other Panel Decision

2

0

2

0%

Total

30

13

17

43%

To be sure, the total number of cases is small. And all but a few
involved one of three areas of law– the free exercise of religion, the
Takings Clause, and the Second Amendment. Nevertheless, it is
impossible not to be struck by the contrast between the comparative
grant rates here and those seen in areas of constitutional law that
reflect the traditional ideological alignment – 33% versus 54% in
constitutional criminal procedure and 27% versus 62% on other issues.
(See Table 1 and Table 5.) To put it another way, liberal ideology
manifested itself more strongly in resisting individual rights claims
supported by conservatives than in advancing the claims supported by
liberals. 385
H. “Economic Liberalism” Cases
More than 50 years ago, Professor Glendon Schubert, one of the
pioneers in the study of judicial ideology, published his landmark book
The Judicial Mind. In it, he separately identified the characteristics of
“political liberalism” and “economic liberalism.” 386 “Political liberalism”
centered on civil liberties cases. 387 To define “economic liberalism,”
Schubert “grouped together sets of cases which involved disputes
That was also the pattern, albeit to a lesser degree, on First Amendment
issues. See supra Table 6.
385
386

GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 99 (1965).

387

Id. at 101.
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between unions and employers; governmental regulation of business
activities; fiscal claims of workers against employers; and disputes
between small businessmen and their large corporate competitors.”388
Liberal decisions “would support the claims of the economically
underprivileged, while the conservative would stand pat and resist
economic change that would benefit the have-nots.” 389 For example,
“the economic liberal would uphold the fiscal claims of injured workers
(or their widows); he would support unions …; [and] he would support
government regulation of business.”
The landscape of federal law has changed considerably since
Schubert wrote, but the ideological alignments of economic liberalism
remain pretty much as he described them. I have already discussed one
large area of law within this category – labor and employment. 390 The
other cases fall into five groups.
First, there are private civil suits under federal statutes such as
the Sherman Act, the securities acts, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). In these cases, a decision favoring the plaintiff
is a liberal decision; a decision favoring the defendant is
conservative. 391 Intellectual property cases, which typically do not have
any ideological valence, are excluded. 392
The second group encompasses business regulation cases to which
the Federal Government is a party. These involve many of the same
statutes as the private suits, but with the Government rather than a
private party seeking to enforce the Congressional directive. Here, a

388

Id. at 127.

Id. at 128. It is curious that by using this tendentious language (“the
conservative would stand pat …”) Schubert makes clear that his own sympathies
were with the liberals. Nevertheless, no one would disagree that economic liberals
support claims of injured workers, government regulation of business, etc.
389

390

See supra Part IV.C

Some of the statutes, like the ADA, implicate non-economic as well as
economic concerns, but their ideological valence is the same, so it makes sense to
include them.
391

See Epstein et al., Behavior, supra note 26, at 150 (noting that Judge Posner,
after reviewing the Spaeth database classifications, “tended to find” intellectual
property cases “impossible to classify ideologically”).
392
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decision favoring the Government is a liberal decision; a decision
favoring the party challenging the regulation is conservative. 393
This definition excludes cases to which the Government is a party
in its capacity as sovereign rather than as a regulator. We have already
encountered two large sets of these cases outside the realm of
“economic
liberalism”:
immigration
appeals
and
criminal
394
prosecutions. In both, of course, a decision favoring the Government
is classified as conservative – the reverse of the alignment in the
regulatory cases. That is also the alignment in many other
Government-as-sovereign cases – for example, those involving FOIA or
Social Security disability claims. Recall, too, Judge Reinhardt’s
comment that “[i]n all types of cases, including tax cases, you’re more
likely to find the liberal judge voting for the individual while his
conservative colleagues tend to uphold the position advocated by the
government.” 395
Here, though, there is a complication. Judge Reinhardt’s typology
accords with “conventional understandings” if we limit it, as he did, to
cases in which the Government as sovereign is engaged in litigation
with an individual. But if the party opposing the Government is not an
individual, ideological classification becomes more fraught. Consider,
for example, the failed en banc call in Altera Corp. v. CIR. 396 This was a
tax case in which the Government’s adversary was a corporation
challenging a regulation governing cost-sharing among related entities.
I doubt that Judge Reinhardt would view a decision favoring the
Government as conservative. 397

There are occasional cases in which a private party sues the Government to
prod an agency to enforce a statute. E.g., LULAC v. Wheeler, 922 F.3d 443 (9th Cir.
2019) (en banc). Consistent with the general approach that traces back to Schubert’s
work, a decision favoring the Government in such a case would be classified as
conservative.
393

394

See supra Part IV.B & IV.D.

395

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.

941 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2019) (M. Smith, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc)
396

The panel opinion in Altera Corp. was joined by three Democratic appointees;
the dissent was joined by three Republican appointees. For that reason – and
397
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It turns out, however, that Altera Corp. is an outlier, and Judge
Reinhardt’s typology fits very well with the general run of governmentas-sovereign cases that were the subject of en banc ballots during the
study period. Indeed, many of the cases closely resemble those in the
first group, except that the plaintiff is seeking relief from the
Government rather than from a private party.
The analysis thus far has been limited to cases in which a party
asserts rights under federal law. But from an ideological perspective,
economic liberalism is also implicated when one party asserts rights
under a state law regulating economic activity and the question is
whether that claim is nullified or limited by federalism-based doctrines,
notably preemption. To classify the ideological direction of panel
decisions of that kind, I looked through to the underlying state
regulation and hypothesized a federal court decision implementing the
regulation. If that decision would be classified as liberal – for example,
if it favored a personal injury plaintiff over the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective product – a decision finding preemption would be
conservative; a decision rejecting preemption and sustaining the statelaw claim would be liberal. 398
Finally, it makes sense to include one subset of the “federal courts”
segment of the docket in which there is an ideological divide that
directly implicates economic liberalism: jurisdiction and procedure in
class actions. Decisions supporting the class action are classified as
liberal; decisions limiting class actions are classified as conservative. 399
Overall, the concept of “economic liberalism” used here is
somewhat broader than Schubert’s (putting aside the separate
treatment of workplace litigation). But it accords with Judge
Reinhardt’s typology for “nonconstitutional areas,” and in all but a

because the issue implicates government regulation of business – I characterized the
panel outcome as liberal.
Disputes involving preemption by federal labor law have been excluded from
consideration here; those were discussed in connection with the workplace litigation
cases. See supra Part IV.C.
398

See Scott Dodson, Book Review, 54 Law & Soc. Rev. 522, 522 (2020) (“The
battle lines across society and politics are clear and entrenched: liberals love class
actions and conservatives hate them.”).
399
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handful of cases the ideological alignments are easily determined in
accordance with “conventional understandings.”
With the category thus defined, in the 23 years of the study there
were 83 en banc calls directed to panel opinions on “economic
liberalism” issues. (See Table 8.) This number is probably smaller than
one would expect. Notwithstanding the vast swath of regulatory and
sovereign activity covered, there are fewer cases in this group than in
immigration law alone. Important areas of federal law – including
antitrust, securities regulation, Social Security, and communications –
contributed no more than two or three cases each.
Table 8
En Banc Ballots: “Economic Liberalism” Cases
Total

Granted

Denied

Percent
Granted

Conservative Panel Decision

40

20

20

50%

Liberal Panel Decision

37

13

24

35%

Other Panel Decision

6

3

3

50%

Total

83

36

47

43%

What about ideology? Two failed calls resisted ideological
classification, and four other calls (three of them successful) lacked
ideological valence. The remaining calls were almost evenly divided
ideologically – 40 that targeted conservative panel decisions and 37
that targeted liberal decisions. But the grant rates were very different.
When the panel decision was conservative, exactly half of the calls were
successful; for liberal panel decisions the odds were almost two to one
against success.
The percentages here closely track those seen in the benchmark
area of constitutional criminal procedure. 400 By the same token, the
divergence between the two grant rates is much smaller than that
found in labor and employment law, even though the latter is a subset
of economic liberalism. 401

400

See supra Part IV.A and Table 1.

401

See supra Part IV.C. and Table 3.
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By far the largest area represented is environmental law, which
accounted for 17 en banc ballots. That preeminence is not surprising;
the Ninth Circuit hears a disproportionate number of environmental
cases, 402 and the court’s environmental decisions have generated much
controversy. 403
Most of the environmental cases on the en banc ballot docket
involved challenges to Federal Government action based on statutes
such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean
Water Act (CWA). Typically the plaintiffs were environmental
organizations, and a decision supporting the claim is characterized as
liberal. 404
Nine of the en banc calls targeted panel decisions that reached
conservative outcomes, and four of these were successful, for a grant
rate of 44%. In all four cases the LEBC ruled in favor of the
environmental claim. 405 In none of those cases did the Government seek
Supreme Court review. 406

See Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business as Usual Analyzing the Development of Environmental Standing Doctrine since 1976, 5 Harv.
L.& Pol’y Rev. 289, 300 (2011) (noting that Ninth and D.C. Circuits “accounted for
over half of all environmental cases brought in the appellate courts over the past
thirty-five years”).
402

See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Western Senators Are Pushing to Break Up Circuit
Court, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1997 (discussing legislation to divide the Ninth Circuit
and quoting Montana Senator as calling for judges who are more sensitive to “how
we manage our own resources”).
403

See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepard, The Long Shadow of Bush v.
Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1434 n. 110
(2016) (noting that liberal single-issue groups include those associated with “proenvironmental policy”).
404

See, e.g., Wilderness Soc. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d
1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), as amended, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that grant of permit for salmon enhancement project violated Wilderness Act).
405

In one case the Government declined to defend the challenged policy and did
not participate in the court of appeals proceedings. See Organized Village of Kake v.
USDA, 795 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
406
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Seven en banc calls questioned liberal outcomes. 407 Three of these
were successful, for a grant rate of 43%. Two of the LEBC decisions
reversed the panel outcome, but in the third case the LEBC, like the
panel, ordered the EPA to act in accordance with the petitioners’
requests. 408 Two of the unsuccessful calls prompted dissentals from
members of the conservative bloc; in both instances the Supreme Court
reversed the panel decision. 409
Overall, the environmental cases reflect no more than a modest
skew in the liberal direction. In that respect, the cases are not
representative of the economic liberalism group generally; if we remove
them from the calculations, the grant rates are somewhat higher for
conservative panel decisions (52%) and somewhat lower for liberal
panel decisions (33%).
One final note. Of the 24 failed calls that targeted liberal panel
decisions, 17 (including the two environmental cases already
mentioned) gave rise to dissentals; and of those, nine were followed by
Supreme Court review and reversal. So although the issues are very
different, the patterns of activity closely resemble those seen in the
constitutional criminal procedure cases.
V. Gauging the Liberalism of the Ninth Circuit
For almost the entirety of the period studied in this Article, Judge
Stephen Reinhardt was the “liberal face” of the Ninth Circuit. 410 To
those on both sides of the ideological divide, he “embodied the liberal
jurisprudence that [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] developed in
One case resisted characterization. See Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d 475 (9th
Cir. 2004) (conservation groups on one side; Indian tribe on the other).
407
408

The latter was LULAC v. Wheeler, 922 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

See United States v. Burlington N. Ry., 520 F.3d 918, 952 (9th Cir. 2008)
(Bea, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), rev’d, 556 U.S. 599 (2009);
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 395 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), panel decision rev’d sub nom. Nat’l
Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). In the latter
case the four liberal Justices dissented. See id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
409

Maura Dolan, Stephen Reinhardt, ‘Liberal Lion’ of the 9th Circuit, Dies at 87,
L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 2018. Judge Reinhardt was appointed to the Ninth Circuit by
President Carter in 1980 and died in March 2018. See id.
410
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the decades following [President Carter’s] appointments.” 411 Yet Judge
Reinhardt himself did not share the widespread perception of the Ninth
Circuit as a liberal court. “Anyone who can count,” he said in 2006, “can
tell you the Ninth Circuit is not a liberal circuit. There are many more
conservative than liberal judges on the court.” 412
This study points to a different conclusion: the Ninth Circuit is a
liberal court. But the study also shows that the liberalism of the Ninth
Circuit is more nuanced and selective than the conventional depictions
would lead one to expect. Before explaining why that is so, it will be
useful to say something about the conservative and liberal blocs on the
Ninth Circuit.
A. Judges, Ideology, and Political Affiliation
For more than a quarter-century – a period that ended with the
death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 2020 – the United States
Supreme Court was composed of a liberal bloc of four Justices and a
conservative bloc of five. 413 Although the membership of the two blocs
changed from time to time as new Justices joined the Court, the
alignment remained the same.
This study shows that during roughly that same period, the Ninth
Circuit also had liberal and conservative blocs. But the parallel is not
exact. All of the Supreme Court Justices could be assigned to one bloc
or the other; that is not true of the Ninth Circuit judges. Instead, what
we find are two cohorts of judges, together comprising about two-thirds
of the court, who actively engaged in the public aspects of the en banc
process – in particular, opinions dissenting from or concurring in the
denial of en banc rehearing. The other judges cast votes and may have
written internal memoranda, but they cannot readily be assigned to

Nicholas Sonnenburg, ‘Liberal lion’ defined 9th Circuit’s progressive
jurisprudence, Los Angeles Daily Journal, Mar. 30, 2018, at 1.
411

Kenneth Ofgang, Ninth Circuit Split Inevitable, Tashima Tells Gathering,
Metro. News-Enterprise, Oct. 30, 2006.
412
413

See Hellman, Reverse Polarity, supra note 76, at 295-300 & Figure 1.
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one ideological bloc or the other based on public information about en
banc activity. 414
Two things stand out about the Ninth Circuit blocs. The first is
that the two blocs retained their distinct identities across the wide
range of issues that generated en banc calls, with almost no crossover
from one to the other. For example, here are the judges who joined
dissentals supporting the conservative position in cases representing
four different areas of federal law:
• Right to counsel and habeas corpus. Dissenting: Judges
O’Scannlain, Gould, Tallman, Bybee, Callahan, Bea, M. Smith,
Ikuta, N.R. Smith, and Owens. 415
• Asylum for aliens. Dissenting: Judges Kozinski, O’Scannlain,
Kleinfeld, Tallman, Bybee, Callahan, Bea, M. Smith, and
Ikuta. 416
• Fair Labor Standards Act. Dissenting: Judges Kozinski,
O’Scannlain, Gould, Tallman, Bybee, Callahan, Bea, M. Smith,
Ikuta, and N.R. Smith. 417
•

Personal jurisdiction. Dissenting: Judges O’Scannlain, Tallman,
Bybee, Callahan, Bea, M. Smith, Ikuta, and N.R. Smith. 418

And here is a sampling of dissentals from the liberal side of the
court:

It may be possible to assign some of those judges to one bloc or the other
based on their votes and opinions in panel cases, but that would require an
enormous research undertaking.
414

Hardy v. Chappell, 849 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2016) (Bea, J., dissenting from
denial of en banc rehearing).
415

Ramadan v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2007) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
416

Or. Restaurant & Lodging Assn. v. Perez, 843 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 2016)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
417

Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 2011)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
418
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• Jury voir dire and habeas. Dissenting: Judges Pregerson,
Reinhardt, Thomas, Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Fisher, Paez,
Berzon, and Rawlinson. 419
• Issue preclusion in immigration cases. Dissenting: Judges
Pregerson, Reinhardt. Hawkins, Tashima, Thomas, McKeown,
Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Fisher, Gould, Paez, and Berzon. 420
• Expert testimony in Title VII case. Dissenting: Judges
Pregerson, Reinhardt, Hawkins, Tashima, Thomas, McKeown,
Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Fisher, Paez, and Berzon. 421
Second, there is a strong correlation between ideology and political
affiliation, generally defined by the party of the appointing President.
Dissentals from the conservative side were overwhelmingly written and
joined by judges appointed by Republican Presidents; those judges were
often joined by Judge Richard Tallman, a Republican appointed by
President Clinton. 422 Dissentals from the liberal side were
overwhelmingly written and joined by appointees of Democratic
Presidents. Former Judge Alex Kozinski was the only Republican
appointee who frequently joined dissentals challenging conservative
panel decisions.
B. A Nuanced and Selective Liberalism
Each of the two groups of judges who frequently wrote or joined
dissentals constituted about one-third of the active judges; thus,
neither group could secure a majority for en banc rehearing without the
support of other members of the court. We do not know how individual
judges voted, but we do know the outcome of the ballots. Table 9
summarizes the data on grants and denials in the eight classes of cases

Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rawlinson, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
419

Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 2004) (Tashima, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
420

Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., 319 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
421
422

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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discussed in detail in the preceding pages. 423 Here I outline some
conclusions drawn both from the numbers and from a review of the
cases.
Table 9
En Banc Ballots: Panel Decisions, 1998-2020
Type of Case

Percent
Granted
Conservative Liberal
Panel
Panel
Decision
Decision

Total

Number
Conservative
Panel
Decision

Liberal
Panel
Decision

Constitutional Criminal
Procedure

234

131

102

54%

33%

Immigration Cases

100

61

39

54%

38%

Labor and Employment
Law

43

25

16

76%

31%

Federal Criminal Law and
Procedure

89

44

42

59%

52%

Other Civil Liberties
Claims: Traditional
Polarity

70

29

41

62%

27%

Freedom of Expression

59

33

20

33%

15%

Reverse Polarity Cases

30

15

13

80%

8%

“Economic Liberalism”
Cases

83

40

37

50%

35%

1. The Ninth Circuit is a predominantly liberal court, but it is not
a reliably liberal court. In all eight classes of cases studied, the success
As noted at the start of Part IV, these eight classes of cases accounted for
more than 90% of the en banc ballots directed to panel opinions during the 23 years
of the study.
423

May 9, 2022

Ideology and En Banc – Page 100

rate for en banc calls that targeted conservative panel decisions was
higher than the rate for calls that targeted liberal decisions. But in
almost all of the groups, a substantial number of conservative panel
decisions were allowed to stand. And some liberal panel decisions were
dislodged by the vote of the full court.
Indeed, a recurring theme is that the full court sometimes used
the en banc process to check the most extreme manifestations of liberal
jurisprudence. The California gubernatorial recall case of 2003 is the
most prominent example, but there are others. 424 This probably
explains why Judge Reinhardt insisted that “the Ninth Circuit is not a
liberal circuit.” He vividly remembered the liberal panel decisions that
he wrote or supported, only to see them set at naught when the full
court granted rehearing.
But cases of that kind were the exception rather than the rule.
More often than not, the en banc ballot process did promote liberal
outcomes.
2. When we look separately at the different kinds of issues that
generated en banc calls, we find a wide variation in the extent to which
the court used the en banc process to produce liberal outcomes. These
disparities,
although
not
supporting
Judge
Reinhardt’s
characterization, show that the liberalism of the Ninth Circuit is both
nuanced and to some degree selective.
At one extreme is the Second Amendment. In every one of the
Second Amendment cases that was the subject of an en banc ballot, the
liberal position – rejection of the constitutional claim – ultimately
prevailed. The skew was almost as great on Takings Clause claims,
another reverse polarity issue, although the number of cases was small.
Among issues that reflect traditional polarity, the liberal skew was
most pronounced in the realm of workplace litigation. When we include
the cases involving preemption by federal labor law, the predominance
of liberal outcomes is even greater than the numbers in the table
suggest.

424

On the California recall case, see supra Part IV.E.
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At the other end of the spectrum are issues of federal criminal law
and procedure not directly implicating the Constitution. There the two
grant rates almost approach parity.
Freedom of expression cases are sui generis. The overall grant rate
for en banc calls from the liberal side is only 33% – much lower than
that for any of the other classes of cases – but for the small number of
reverse polarity cases it is 50%. Consistent with the overall pattern, en
banc calls from the conservative side fared worse in both groups.
3. The findings of the study shed light on the phenomenon that
Professors Devins and Larsen refer to as “weaponizing en banc.” 425 The
authors use the phrase to denote a “team mentality” whereby judges on
the courts of appeals “vote in blocs aligned by the party of the President
who appointed them and use en banc review to reverse panels
composed of members from the other team.” 426
As already noted, membership in a partisan “team” correlates
closely with ideology. But what we see in the Ninth Circuit, as detailed
in the preceding pages, is something more subtle and contingent than
the “weaponization” that concerns Professors Devins and Larsen. Some
issue areas – the Second Amendment, the Takings Clause, and perhaps
workplace law – do exemplify what looks like weaponization. But those
are exceptions. Elsewhere, the liberal side prevailed more often than
not, but the conservative side was not shut out.
In this connection, it is possible that the Ninth Circuit’s unique
use of the limited en banc court has served as something of a check on
the ability – and perhaps the inclination – of the ideological majority to
“weaponize” the en banc process. This may happen in two ways. First,
when the liberal majority votes in favor of en banc rehearing of a
conservative panel decision, the luck of the draw may result in a ruling
by the LEBC that substantially ratifies the panel ruling. 427 Second, the
members of the liberal majority may sometimes be reluctant to vote for
en banc rehearing of a conservative panel decision for the very reason
425

Devins & Larsen, supra note 25.

426

Id. at 1373.

Research has shown that the LEBC usually reaches the opposite result from
the panel, but that does not always happen. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text.
427
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that – unlike their counterparts in other circuits – they do not know
who will be sitting on the en banc court. 428
4. From the mid-1980s to the present, the perception of the Ninth
Circuit as a very liberal court has been fueled by the court’s record of
reversals in the Supreme Court. 429 That is because, overwhelmingly,
the reversals have come in cases where the Ninth Circuit had reached a
liberal result. 430 More recently, the idea has gained further traction
from the now-familiar sequence of dissental by members of the Ninth
Circuit’s conservative cohort followed by review and reversal in the
Supreme Court. 431
This study shows, however, that cases following that path are only
part of the story. In other cases, the Supreme Court denies review
notwithstanding a fiery dissental from the conservative side. Or a
liberal panel opinion is the subject of a successful en banc call, and the
LEBC reaches a conservative result. Or a conservative panel opinion is
superseded by a liberal ruling by the LEBC – but Supreme Court
review is denied or not even sought. All of these sequences have made
their appearance in this Article, and all must be taken into account in
considering what the Supreme Court’s actions (or inactions) tell us
about the ideological orientation of the Ninth Circuit.
Conclusion
The conventional wisdom is not wrong. Contrary to Judge
Reinhardt’s assertion, the Ninth Circuit is a liberal court. But it is
understandable that Judge Reinhardt would see things differently,
because the court as a whole is not as liberal as he was. A majority of
his colleagues might agree, in general terms, with the positions that he
See Maura Dolan, Rapid changes strain the 9th Circuit; Trump's 10 picks
have begun to shift court's longtime liberal bent and stirred criticism from veteran
judges, L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 2020 (available on NEXIS) (attributing to judges the
view that “even now Democratic appointees are likely to be more reluctant to ask for
11-judge panels to review conservative decisions because the larger en banc panels,
chosen randomly, might be dominated by Republicans”).
428

429

See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 8.

See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme
Court, and the Congress, 77 Or. L. Rev. 405, 410 (1998).
430
431

See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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ascribed to “liberal judges,” but that does not necessarily mean that
they would vote for a liberal outcome on every en banc ballot or indeed
on every close panel decision. On the contrary, the study shows that it
was not uncommon for liberal icons like Judge Reinhardt and Judge
Pregerson to find themselves on the losing side of en banc votes.
Today, President Biden is remaking the Ninth Circuit with a
young new generation of Democratic appointees. A few years from now,
it will be time for another examination of ideology and the en banc
process in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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